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Editor’s Introduction
Volume 6, issue 2 is a general issue that contains an eclectic mix of articles which
cover a broad range of topics directly related to the prevention and understanding
of genocide in the modern era and testify to the diversity and strength of the field
of genocide studies.
The first selection by Stephen Burgess, Professor at the US Air War College,
examines the proposal to create an African Standby Force to intervene when geno-
cide threatens on the continent. Burgess points out that African leaders approved
the formation of the African Standby Force (ASF) and ‘‘signed off on the promise
that the ASF would be prepared by 2010 to intervene to stop genocide.’’ He notes
that the leaders of the various countries have failed to come close to meeting the
2010 deadline and that this ‘‘calls into question the credibility of . . . concepts such
as the ‘African Renaissance’ and ‘African solutions for African Problems.’ ’’ He con-
cludes by noting, ‘‘Challenging timetables may prod African governments to develop
their militaries, but they also lead to unrealistic expectations and suboptimal perfor-
mance, such as the AU missions in Darfur and Somalia.’’
The second selection, ‘‘Healing Psychosocial Trauma in the Midst of Truth Com-
missions: The Case of Gacaca in Post-Genocide Rwanda,’’ by Regine King, PhD
candidate at the Factor-Inwentash Faculty of Social Work, University of Toronto,
argues that while truth commissions ‘‘emphasize the dimensions of truth telling,
apology, forgiveness, and reconciliation, in practice, they are often challenged to
fulfill the mandate of healing psychosocial traumas through these dimensions in
countries that suffer not only from the traumatic experience of wars and genocide,
but also from the multiple psychosocial issues that result from these forms of mass
violence.’’ She examines the role of gacaca, ‘‘a form of truth commission that was
introduced in post-genocide Rwanda in 2002,’’ and argues that relying only on gacaca
to heal psychosocial trauma underestimates ‘‘the depth of suffering that the genocide
created both at the individual and collective levels in Rwandan communities.’’ She
suggests that other models should be adopted to supplement gacaca.
The third article, ‘‘From Bloodless Revolution to Bloody Counterrevolution: The
Adana Massacres of 1909,’’ by Bedross Der Matossian, Assistant Professor of Modern
Middle East History in the Department of History at the University of Nebraska/
Lincoln, examines the historiography of the Adana Massacres of 1909. He notes
that there are two diverging views. According to Matossian, ‘‘While some Turkish
scholars deny the involvement of the local government officials in the massacres
by putting all of the blame on the Armenians who revolted as part of a conspiracy
to establish a kingdom in Cilicia, some Armenian scholars, whose work is over-
shadowed by the Armenian genocide, accuse the Committee of Union and Progress
(CUP) of acting behind the scenes to destroy the Armenian economic infrastructure
in Adana in order to curb any future political and economic development in the
area.’’ This article ‘‘contends that the Adana Massacres should be viewed as part of
the revolutionary process which led to the erosion of social and political stability in
the region’’ and which intensified the violence perpetrated against ‘‘the vulnerable
Armenian population of Adana.’’
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The fourth contribution to volume 6, issue 2, ‘‘Did Newsnight Miss the Story? A
Survey of How the BBC’s ‘Flagship Political Current Affairs Program’ Reported
Genocide and War in Rwanda between April and July 1994,’’ is one of the few exami-
nations of the role played by the media in exposing or ignoring an ongoing genocide.
In this article, Georgina Holmes, a scholar of international relations theory and the
media, notes that in 1994 the BBC program Newsnight was one of the few ‘‘within
which representatives of the British government, opposition parties, the United
Nations, and international non-governmental organizations could comment on British
foreign policy.’’ Holmes analyzes Newsnight reporting between 6 April 1994 and 30
September 1994, with a particular focus on reporting until 31 July 1994, and con-
cludes that ‘‘despite a stack of media evidence that genocide was taking place, no
representatives of the British government or opposition parties were interviewed on
the role of the UK as a permanent member of the UN Security Council and signatory
of the UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.’’
Instead, she notes, the discussion focused on the shortcomings of the UN bureau-
cracy and were characterized by a refusal to use the word ‘‘genocide.’’ She concludes
that Newsnight missed the story and ‘‘failed to hold British politicians to account.’’
The final article, ‘‘George Steiner and the War against the Jews: A Study in Mis-
representation,’’ by Roger Smith, Professor Emeritus of government at the College of
William and Mary, examines the work of George Steiner, the ‘‘pre-eminent literary
critic of the past fifty years.’’ Smith argues that Steiner’s ‘‘work on the Holocaust is
misleading in its interpretations, explanations, and implications.’’ Smith notes that
part of Steiner’s view stems from the fact that he was worried ‘‘that the Jews
brought their near destruction upon themselves: that they invented the practice
of genocide, had invented the idea of a ‘chosen people,’ had through Moses, Jesus,
and Marx created such moral demands upon ordinary human beings that the tension
became unbearable and resulted in a revolt against the tyranny of conscience
and perfection.’’ Smith notes that Steiner’s brilliant use of language—he calls it
‘‘dazzling prose’’—can overwhelm ‘‘critical thought and lead one away from a factual
understanding of the origins and consequences of the Holocaust.’’ Smith seeks to
correct that and direct the reader to the shortcomings in Steiner’s work as it applies
to the Holocaust.
In conclusion, volume 6, issue 2 contains a variety of articles on the prevention
and punishment of the crime of genocide. We think, and hope that readers agree,
that this issue helps to enhance our understanding of the causes of genocide and
ways to prevent it. Our next issue, volume 6, issue 3 will be another special issue:
60 Years after Ratification of the Genocide Convention: Critical Reflections on the
State and Future of Genocide Studies.
Herb Hirsch
GSP Co-editor
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The African Standby Force, Genocide,
and International Relations Theory
Stephen Burgess1
US Air War College
In launching the African Standby Force (ASF), African leaders over-promised to
stop genocide, given their lack of political will, the weak capacity of their states,
and the weak military capability of the Force’s subregional brigades. The explana-
tion lies in a combination of South African idealism and determination to exert
continental leadership and the desire of African leaders to sustain or increase
aid to their under-resourced militaries. South Africa does not have the power or
resources necessary to supply sufficient public goods to make the ASF fully func-
tional and capable of fulfilling all tasks. African leaders promised to stop genocide
with the calculation that no one with sanctioning power would challenge them.
Burden shifting by the United States and other major powers was such that
African leaders expected to be rewarded with increased aid flows. A combination
of African nationalism and aid dependence trumped a highly needed international
public good—the political will and military capability to stop genocide.
Key words: African Standby Force, genocide, intervention, idealism, burden
shifting, political will, aid dependence, capacity and capability
In international politics, it is common for the leaders of states and organizations to
make promises and commitments to supply international security and then not de-
liver on such promises. In contrast, domestic ‘‘political entrepreneurs’’ are usually
punished, particularly in democracies, if they do not at least partially fulfill promises
to deliver national security and other public goods. The anarchical nature of inter-
national politics means that there is little incentive to prevent leaders from making
promises to supply international security and other public goods that they know
might not be fulfilled. Furthermore, the leaders of member states belonging to an
international organization are able to ‘‘scapegoat’’ the body; thereby, leaders can
minimize responsibility for over-promising and failing to fulfill those promises.
According to realist theory, the collective action problem and the tendency of weaker
states to ‘‘free ride’’ can only be overcome by a hegemonic power which is willing
to supply the lion’s share of the goods.2 According to institutionalist theory, a
hegemonic power can lead in establishing a ‘‘regime’’ to which member states con-
tribute a share, thus mitigating free ridership.3 In international security, the two
best-known regimes revolve around the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
and collective defense and the United Nations (UN) and peacekeeping and peace-
building. However, in a crisis situation, such as the 1994 Rwandan and 2004 Darfur
genocides, regimes and their rules are not sufficient to compel UN or NATO member
states to act and the hegemonic power—the United States—to lead in order to
supply the necessary public goods.
There are various reasons why leaders over-promise or make unattainable
promises to supply international security and other public goods, including a desire
for prestige as well as earnest efforts to solve difficult international problems. Some
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leaders make promises without realizing that there may be a lack of political will
and capability to respond, while others consciously lie.4 Middle powers and smaller
states wish to demonstrate their usefulness in the international order, and poorer
states strive to receive aid. Leaders of organizations such as the UN and African
Union (AU) over-promise because of a desire to prove the legitimacy of their organi-
zations and its worthiness to receive financial support or because of pressures from
member states to respond to supply security.5
The hegemonic power and other strong states tend to cooperate with weak states
and organizations in order to ‘‘burden shift’’ and provide aid and/or side payments,
thereby compounding the problem and adding to the shortfall in international security
caused by over-promising. This tendency is explained by the difficulty and costliness
of supplying security in genocidal situations combined with the lack of interest and
low salience of more powerful states. As an alternative, major powers persuade and
pressure smaller and weaker states and international organizations to assume burdens
that they lack the capability and will to manage. The gap between weak states’ over-
promising and powerful states’ burden shifting compounds the collective action prob-
lem and causes failures in international security, including the failure to intervene
to stop genocide.
One of the thorniest international security issues is preventing or stopping
genocide. Most states have ratified the 1948 Genocide Convention, which obliges
them to ‘‘prevent and punish genocide.’’6 However, states have not acted to prevent
or stop genocide, especially in Rwanda (1994), Darfur (2003–2004), and Bosnia
(1992–1995). A principal limiting factor has been a lack of political will on the part
of state leaders, including the leaders of major powers, to send forces to intervene in
the internal affairs of sovereign states. A secondary factor has been a lack of military
capacity on the part of states in the affected region that might have an interest in
preventing genocide and keeping it from spilling over their borders.
A relevant case of over-promising international security is that of African leaders
who approved the formation of the African Standby Force (ASF) and signed off on
the promise that the ASF would be prepared by 2010 to intervene to stop genocide.
In 2003, the AU Peace and Security Commission and the African Chiefs of Defense
Staff (ACDS) devised the ASF and outlined six ‘‘typical conflict scenarios’’ in the
ASF’s policy framework. By 2010 the ASF would be able to meet the challenges
presented by six scenarios laid out by the ACDS. The most challenging would be
Scenario 6, the deployment of a robust military presence in 14 days to stop genocide:
1.6 A number of typical conflict scenarios, outlined below were used to develop the
proposals in this document:
f. Scenario 6. AU intervention—e.g. genocide situations where international com-
munity does not act promptly.
The document specifies the capabilities that would be required by the ASF to respond
to ‘‘genocide situations’’:
2.8 The speed with which forces will be required to deploy has particular impli-
cations for standby force structures and arrangements. Linked to this is the type of
conflict into which they will deploy. Given the fluid and uncertain nature of conflict,
particularly in Africa, coherence on deployment will be critical. This demands that
units and HQ staff will have trained together prior to deployment. Significant impli-
cations of varying readiness levels are:
At 14 days readiness collective training involving field exercises with all units is
essential prior to activation. At this level of readiness there is also a clear require-
ment for a standing fully staffed brigade HQ and HQ support. There is also a require-
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ment for an established and fully stocked logistics system capable of sustaining the
entire brigade. Apart from large military alliances such as NATO, individual Member
States may be best placed to provide this capability.
The document stipulates the need for rapid reaction capability to respond in two
weeks’ time:
2.9 Bearing this in mind, the Meeting recommends the following long-term deploy-
ment targets for the ASF (all timings are from an AU mandate resolution):
c. Due to the nature of situations demanding intervention operations, Scenario 6, it
will be important the AU can deploy a robust military force in 14 days.7
At the July 2004 summit in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, the AU heads of state approved
the proposal for the ASF, including the policy framework and intention to respond to
Scenario 6, with 2010 as the target date for full implementation. However, 2010 has
come and gone, and African countries and the ASF have not come any closer to being
able to meet the challenge of Scenario 6. African leaders have little or no will to
intervene in the sovereign affairs of African states. African states do not have the
capacity and the ASF does not have the military capability to respond to Scenario
6. This is clear if African military capabilities, and especially those of the ASF sub-
regional brigades, are examined in relation to the task of intervening to stop geno-
cide. It appears that, by approving the ASF, AU heads of state and ACDS leaders
were over-promising, though probably not lying. The reasons for over-promising
vary from African heads of state and defense forces that were willing to go along
with the ASF proposal because it increased the likelihood of receiving aid to South
African President Thabo Mbeki, who had a long-term political and security vision
for Africa, and to South African security experts, who helped operationalize Mbeki’s
vision. Mbeki and other South African leaders and officials promoted the goals of
an ‘‘African Renaissance’’ and ‘‘African solutions for African problems,’’ and African
nationalist ideology is the basis for several grand schemes, including the ASF.8
Given the lack of accountability in international politics and the tendency to
over-promise, an additional question is how far are leaders, states, and organizations
willing to push their promises. Is there anything that constrains them from making
wildly unrealistic promises and lying? It would seem that there is a certain point at
which incredulity arises about the promises of weaker states and organizations and
at which stronger powers must step in to provide international security and other
public goods or turn to the United Nations (UN) to do so, which is what happened
after the AU failed to stop genocide in Darfur from 2004 to 2007 and was superseded
by the UN.9
Genocide and What It Takes to Stop It
As defined by the Genocide Convention,
genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or
in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its
physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.10
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The difficulty of proving ‘‘intent to destroy’’ has led to disagreements about whether
or not the mass killings and displacement of people in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Darfur
constituted genocide or the more euphemistic ‘‘ethnic cleansing.’’ Subsequently, former
President Slobodan Milosˇevic´ of Serbia and President Omar el-Bashir of Sudan were
indicted by international courts on charges of genocide.
Only in the case of Kosovo in 1999 was NATO able to stop ethnic cleansing, but
only after 850,000 people had been expelled from their homes by Serbian forces. A
key factor was the political will of President Bill Clinton, Secretary of State Madeline
Albright, and other NATO leaders to prevent the 1992 Bosnian ethnic cleansing that
had dragged on for three years from repeating in Kosovo. However, NATO leaders
were reluctant to risk any casualties and announced that no ground forces would be
used. Fortunately, the United States and other NATO members were able to use air
force to coerce Serbia to stop ethnic cleansing and allow Kosovar Albanians to return
to their homes. The Bosnia case demonstrates that weak political will and under-
mobilized capability lead to failure, while Kosovo shows that a combination of strong
political will and technologically advanced capacity and capability can stop genocide.
African leaders lack the will, capacity, and capability to do the same.
The Lack of Political Will to Stop Genocide in Africa
There is a large body of evidence to prove that there is a lack of political will on the
part of African state and organization leaders to stop genocide.11 Since the formation
of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 1963, African leaders have agreed on
the importance of sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of member
states.12 When genocide was committed in Burundi in 1972 and 1993 and in Rwanda
in 1994, African states and organizations did nothing to intervene.13 When Tanzania
intervened in Uganda in 1979 to overthrow the murderous Idi Amin regime, wide-
spread protests were raised by OAU member states against the violation of sover-
eignty. Furthermore, Tanzania only invaded after Amin had ordered his forces to
seize a section of Tanzanian territory.
With the foundation of the AU in 2002, it was hoped that the new organization,
with South African leadership, would be more assertive in providing greater Africa-
wide security and perhaps even be able to prevent or stop genocide. However, the
AU did not respond in 2003 and 2004 to genocide in Darfur as a result of a lack of
political will and a shortfall of African military forces. South African leadership in
the AU did not make a difference. The Sudanese military dictatorship was deter-
mined to continue its scorched-earth campaign and resisted all efforts to place an
effective international force in Darfur. Only after hundreds of thousands were killed
and millions displaced as well as considerable international pressure did the Sudanese
government agree to the deployment of an AU peacekeeping force. This force proved
inadequate, and the Sudanese military and militias continued to destroy villages and
murder, rape, and displace people.
The lack of political will to punish genocide has been recently manifested in
many African leaders’ refusal to accept the 2009 indictment of President Omar El-
Bashir by the International Criminal Court (ICC) for ordering massive crimes
against humanity, including genocide, in Darfur. A 2009 AU heads of state summit,
in fact, called on the UN Security Council to delay the ICC indictment from coming
into effect.14 Political resistance to genocide prevention has also been evidenced by
the controversy over the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) principle, which stipulates
that governments must commit to protect civilians or call on international assistance
if unable to do so. Many African states have resisted signing up for the principle in
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the UN because they fear external intervention in their own internal affairs. Efforts
to separate the R2P principle from the type of humanitarian intervention that would
be needed to stop genocide have met with limited success.15
The Lack of Capacity and Capability to Stop Genocide
On paper and in practice, the African Standby Force (ASF) and African militaries
lack the enforcement capabilities needed to intervene, stop genocide, and defeat
spoilers. At present, the ASF mainly consists of a dozen or so infantry battalions.16
The ASF possesses little of the armor, airborne and air power capabilities that an
intervention to stop genocide requires.17 Furthermore, a multinational force will be
unable to achieve the unity of effort to deploy and stop genocide.
More specifically, the full implementation of the ASF subregional commands
entails the development of a number of other capabilities, including airlift, sealift,
and ground transportation to dispatch the rapid deployment units and main ASF
brigades and their equipment to conflict zones and re-supply them. Considerable
logistics and maintenance capabilities are needed to sustain the brigades on a multi-
national basis. Interoperability, including interoperable communications, is required
for the brigades to achieve unity of effort in the field. Intelligence capabilities are
needed to allow the brigades to operate effectively in their areas of responsibility.18
Full ASF implementation means that the full cost of it must be borne by each of
the subregional commands and their member states, which is still a distant dream.
Effective command and control by subregional organizations and force commanders
over the brigades require combined training exercises as well as sound communica-
tion with subregional headquarters and the AU Peace and Security Commission. The
subregional brigades are charged with developing the ability to deploy field level
headquarters that take orders from the AU mission planning cell in Addis Ababa.
All of these capabilities are presently lacking to one degree or another. The ASF
and the subregional brigades did not achieve full implementation by the December
2010 deadline and the ASF is unable to intervene in ‘‘genocide situations where
international community does not act promptly.’’
Some subregional brigades will be more effective in practice than others. The
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the West African
Brigade (ECOBRIG) appear to be well organized, led, and planned, but they have
not proven their effectiveness in the field and do not have the capability to respond
rapidly to stop genocide. The Southern African Development Community (SADC)
and the Southern African brigade (SADCBRIG) with South African leadership will
probably be more effective if their commitment level continues to increase. The South
African National Defense Force may still possess the capability of leading a response
to genocide even though it has deteriorated over the last decade. The East African
brigade (EASBRIG) has the advantage of the highly capable and willing Rwandan
military, which is providing leadership in the building of a rapid reaction force and
could lead a response to genocide. The EASBRIG suffers from a lack of command and
control as a result of Ethiopia’s detachment from the countries of the East African
Community.
The countries of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS)
have relied on France for leadership, organization, and logistics, especially in peace-
keeping operations in the Central African Republic (CAR); thus far, the Central African
brigade does not have the capability to respond to genocide. The North African brigade
is presently organizing under Egyptian, Libyan, and Algerian leadership, but unity
of effort is proving difficult.
The ASF, Genocide, and International Relations
125
The hardest part—full and effective ASF operationalization with the rapid reac-
tion capability that can stop genocide—remains to be developed. Well into the future,
there will be chronically unstable states, such as Somalia, Sudan (North and South),
Central African Republic, Chad, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC),
which will continue to face military challenges from rogue states, insurgents, war-
lords, and militias that the ASF will not be able to confront and defeat. Even in the
long run, it is not likely that the ASF subregional commands will be a force for rapid
response in ‘‘genocide situations.’’ Africa’s poverty and lack of state capacity are
major impediments that prevent the ASF subregional commands from being fully
developed.
In practice, the operational cases of African peacekeepers in conflict zones, in-
cluding Darfur and Somalia, have not been encouraging. The African Union Mission
in Sudan (AMIS) was undersubscribed with only a few thousand peacekeepers without
helicopters or other mobility, which meant that the mission was largely ineffectual
for four years.19 In 2008, the UN established a hybrid mission that expanded the
peacekeeping force from 5,000 troops to 19,500 troops and 6,500 police. This hybrid
mission proved more effective, but conflict and human rights abuses continued. The
African Union Mission in Somalia (AMSIOM) has been even weaker. Less than half
of the requested 8,000 troops were deployed and Nigeria, Ghana, and Malawi refused
to fulfill pledges to deploy battalions. As a result, AMISOM peacekeepers have been
confined to Mogadishu and have become targets for Al Shabaab Islamist militia
fighters.
Other relevant examples include Coˆte d’Ivoire in 2002, where ECOWAS forces
proved inadequate to stabilize the situation in the wake of civil war and French
forces had to enforce a cease-fire. In Liberia in 2003, Nigeria and other ECOWAS
states intervened in the wake of a cease-fire but needed the threat of force from the
26th US Marine Expeditionary Unit to ensure stability.20 A month later, ECOWAS
handed over authority to the UN Peacekeeping Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), which
had the capacity to build up the peacekeeping force and sustain it.
The fundamental problem for African militaries and the ASF is a lack of assets,
resources, and sustainability. Future economic growth may provide some African
states with greater resources for possible use in building the ASF and subregional
brigades. However, this will still leave the ASF and its brigades deficient in regard
to the type of resources to fully develop, achieve self-sufficiency, and be successful in
addressing Scenario 6. More specifically, it is difficult for poor countries lacking
trained personnel to develop airlift, logistics, and maintenance. Most small militaries
cannot afford to maintain standby units and keep them in a state of readiness for
extended periods. There is the possibility that donor fatigue will arise and that ASF
structures and functions will atrophy.21
Political will and force projection capabilities are the missing ingredients that
can only be provided by the United States, Britain, France, and a few other coun-
tries.22 Their leadership in NATO intervention in Bosnia in 1995 and Kosovo in
1999 established a security regime against genocide and ethnic cleansing in most of
Europe outside of Russia’s sphere of influence.23 In Africa, there are no great powers
that can provide the political will and military capability to counter genocide.
Why African Leaders Promised to Stop Genocide
The motivation to promise to stop genocide came in the wake of criticism of the
OAU and African leaders who did nothing as the Rwandan genocide unfolded over
100 days. In particular, Nelson Mandela and Thabo Mbeki came to power in South
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Africa on 10 May 1994 as genocide was occurring and regretted their inability to act.
In response, both Mandela and Mbeki strove to find a way to stop mass killings in
Burundi. In 2000, Mandela assumed control of negotiations to end civil war in
Burundi and develop a power-sharing arrangement, and his successor, President
Thabo Mbeki, committed South African troops to protect Burundian political leaders
and then act as the vanguard of the AU Peacekeeping Mission in Burundi (AMIB).
The South African determination to stop mass killings and genocide influenced its
leadership role in the formation of the ASF and the commitment to stop genocide.24
Mbeki promoted the African Renaissance concept with the vision of ending vio-
lence, elitism, corruption, and poverty in Africa and creating the basis for economic
progress.25 Mbeki’s leadership, South African diplomacy, and the cooperation of a
number of prominent African leaders played a major role in the African Renaissance
campaign and the 2002 founding of the African Union. Under the AU Charter, the
AU Peace and Security Council was given greater power to authorize intervention
in conflicts and to monitor human rights situations in member states. On paper,
sovereignty would no longer be as powerful as it had been under the OAU Charter.
In a similar vein, South African leadership spawned the New Partnership for
Africa’s Development (NEPAD) and the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), to
which African states would submit to review their security and governance situa-
tions. The African Renaissance, NEPAD, and APRM were manifestations of African
nationalism as well as South African liberal internationalist repackaging. One of the
aims was to attract more aid and investment from the West. The slogan, ‘‘African
solutions to African problems,’’ became prominent among African leaders at this
time.26
South African idealism, manifested in the African Renaissance concept, was re-
flected in the establishment of the ASF.27 After the founding of the AU Peace and
Security Council, and Peace and Security Commission, South African leadership
played a major role in influencing the African Chiefs of Defense Staff (ACDS) to
adopt the ASF policy framework, including Scenario 6—AU intervention in genocide
situations. In July 2004, African leaders signed off on the ASF policy framework with
little comment on Scenario 6. For them, it was more important to launch the ASF
with the prospect of attracting Western aid. Therefore, over-promising to stop geno-
cide was largely a product of South African ambition and hegemony as well as acqui-
escence by African leaders to seek an increasing flow of aid for their militaries.28
Why the United States and Other Major Powers Burden Shifted
The United States, as well as Britain, France, and other major powers, allowed the
AU and ACDS’s commitment to use the ASF to intervene to stop genocide to go
unchallenged, which fits into the pattern of powerful states’ burden shifting when
intervention is not in their national interest. Clearly, intervention to stop genocide
in Africa has not been and is not in their national interest.29 Ever since the 1993
killing of 18 US soldiers in a peace enforcement mission in Somalia, the United
States sought to avoid intervention in Africa at all costs and shift the security burden
to African states. After the United States failed to respond to the Rwandan genocide,
the Clinton administration apologized for failing to act but still sought to shift the
burden of responding to genocide to African states. In 1996 the United States pro-
posed an African Crisis Response Force which, developed with US and European
funding and training, would create a standby force that could, among other things,
intervene to stop genocide. After African leaders rejected the concept as too paternal-
istic, the United States launched the African Crisis Response Initiative (1997–2001)
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to train African peacekeepers and followed it with the Africa Contingency Training
and Assistance (ACOTA) program from 2002 onward. In 2004, the United States
joined European states in the Global Peace Operations Initiative to cooperate in
training 75,000 African peacekeepers. The vast majority of training by the United
States, France, Britain, and other countries prepared peacekeepers to serve only
once a cease-fire had been secured. Very little of the training was suitable to prepare
for intervention in genocide situations, which is what had supposedly motivated the
United States and other countries to initiate the training in the first place.
In 2007, the United States announced the formation of the US Africa Command
(AFRICOM), which became fully operational in October 2008. The mission of AFRICOM
is to partner with African militaries with the aim of making them more effective
operationally. AFRICOM accomplishes its mission primarily through joint exercises
with African militaries. AFRICOM has been particularly interested in working with
the ASF and moving it toward operational effectiveness. AFRICOM has done little or
nothing to prepare to intervene in order to stop genocide.30
Conclusion
Given their lack of political will, the weak capacity of their states, and the weak
military capability of the ASF subregional brigades, African political and military
leaders have over-promised to stop genocide in agreeing to respond to ASF Scenario
6. The explanation for this behavior lies in a combination of South African idealism,
exemplified by the African Renaissance concept, and determination to exert con-
tinental leadership and African leaders’ desire to sustain or increase aid to their
under-resourced militaries. South African behavior fits the mold of middle powers,
which try to make an impact on the international system through multilateral initia-
tives that appear overly idealistic.31 South Africa, as the aspiring hegemon in Africa,
does not have the power or resources to supply sufficient public goods to make the
ASF fully functional and capable of fulfilling all tasks.32
The conduct of African leaders can be explained by their countries’ poverty and
their desire to obtain resources to sustain their militaries.33 African leaders promised
to stop genocide with the calculation that no one with sanctioning power would chal-
lenge them. Indeed, as African leaders had anticipated, the United States and other
major powers responded with burden-shifting behavior and rewarded the ASF pro-
posal with increased aid flows. Also, Scenario 6 was just a part of the ASF policy
framework and did not attract the attention of the human rights NGO community
or that of the major powers. Thus, a curious combination of African nationalism and
aid dependence trumped a highly needed international public good—the political will
and military capability to stop genocide. In several regions of the world, weak states
and organizations exhibit similarly contradictory behavior.
In regard to the limits of over-promising, the ASF policy framework did not
contain the promise that African standby brigades would always be able to stop
genocide on their own. Indeed, the ASF policy framework stated that it would inter-
vene in ‘‘genocide situations where international community does not act promptly.’’
However, given the unwillingness of the United States and other major powers to
‘‘act promptly’’ and intervene, the promise was actually grander than it may have
seemed. In regard to over-promising that the ASF would be fully operational and
capable of acting in all six scenarios by the end of 2010, this was done with the aim
of injecting a sense of urgency into the development of the ASF. However, the failure
to come close to meeting the 2010 deadline calls into question the credibility of
African leaders and even concepts such as the ‘‘African Renaissance’’ and ‘‘African
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solutions for African problems.’’34 The ASF goals to be fully operational by 2010 and
to stop genocide reflect a tendency to set unattainable goals. This is evident in the
2015 target date for achieving the Millennium Development Goals for Africa, an
aim that will likely not be met. It is also apparent in the unrealistic goals of
the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD), especially the African Peer
Review Mechanism (APRM), which promises that African states will make major
changes to their governance in response to peer review and the desire to increase
foreign investment. Challenging timetables may prod African governments to de-
velop their militaries, but they also lead to unrealistic expectations and suboptimal
performance, such as the AU missions in Darfur and Somalia.
The ASF concept will not be fully implemented in the foreseeable future because
African states are too poor and lack the capacity necessary for implementation. In
spite of this reality, African leaders, organizations, and advisers have set up a
scheme that promises to stop genocide and fully deploy but has not been able to do
so by December 2010 and will have difficulty in doing so by December 2020. Never-
theless, African leaders are attempting to demonstrate that African states and organ-
izations are making an organized effort to posture for action and will continue to ask
the major powers to fill shortfalls in financial and military resources. Over-promising
and the failure to fully operationalize the ASF lead one to conclude that the next
genocide in Africa will be met with a failure to act with sufficient strength.
In regard to burden shifting, the ASF promise to intervene to stop genocide and
the slogan of ‘‘African solutions for African problems’’ were welcomed by the United
States and other major powers, which had been struggling to find ways to stop geno-
cide. The ASF complemented the preventive Responsibility to Protect principle and
the transitional justice institution, the ICC. The ASF proposal enabled the United
States and other major powers to invest energies in working with African organiza-
tions and militaries without having to develop the doctrine, rapid reaction forces,
and contingency plans to intervene to stop genocide.
Given the importance of stopping genocide, alternatives must be sought for the
ASF concept, which lacks the political will and capability to stop genocide. African
leaders and organizations should openly admit that Africa will not be fully capable
to stop genocide while they call on the major powers to fill the gaps and intervene.
The international community should pressure the African Union and African states
to give an honest account of ASF progress, and lack thereof, and what steps need to
be taken to fill the gaps.
In regard to stopping genocide, the R2P principle and the transitional justice
regime, embodied by the ICC, are providing alternatives, though suboptimal, to the
use of force. The international community, led by human rights NGOs, needs to con-
tinue to pressure the major powers and African states and organizations to establish
a compact to stop genocide and other major man-made humanitarian disasters. A
stepping stone to such a compact would be a commitment by African states to the
R2P principle.35 With such a commitment, the ASF and developed country forces
would find it easier to work together to overcome sovereignty claims and intervene
to stop genocide.
Increased commitment and political will by the United States and other major
powers in cooperation with a coalition of the willing, including NGOs such as
ENOUGH,36 could contribute to stopping genocide. The United States and other
major powers could provide rapid reaction and air power capabilities and logistics
in cooperation with African forces to stop genocide. An example was in Liberia
in 2003, when a highly capable force—the 26th US Marine Expeditionary Unit
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(MEU)—combined with a highly salient force—the Nigerian-led ECOWAS Military
Mission to Liberia (ECOMIL)—to stabilize a volatile situation, where a cease-fire
agreement could have collapsed. Nigerian and ECOWAS desire to end the tyrannical
rule of Charles Taylor and US action led to the end of a dangerous stalemate in
2003.37 The Liberian case demonstrates that salience is important; if deployment is
within the subregion, high salience will motivate the ASF brigades to respond more
effectively than if deployed outside of the subregion. If regional military cooperation
develops and flourishes, as perhaps in the case of ECOWAS and the West African
standby brigade (ECOBRIG), subregional capability to deal with some of the more
challenging scenarios requiring enforcement will be enhanced.
A larger question pertains to how African militaries should be organized and led
in peace and stability operations. Given the scarcity of resources and dependence on
donors and likelihood of more internal conflict in weak African states, the ASF and
the subregional commands are not sustainable and will not be for a very consider-
able period to come. Donor fatigue will eventually pose problems for the ASF. The
ASF represents a diversion of scarce resources and time that Africa and its mili-
taries could invest in alternative methods for enhancing African security. The ASF
may make African militaries more communicative with each other, but it will not
make them dramatically more capable operationally. The lack of logistics, airlift,
and training prevents operational progress. Also, it is easier to maintain national
units rather than a multinational force with elaborate and difficult command as
well as control and planning mechanisms.
Resources being spent on ASF subregional brigades and the AU Peace and Security
Commission could be used to better effect to develop the capability of the armed
forces of individual states to serve in UN peacekeeping missions. A greater number
of highly effective national battalions and brigades could be developed that could be
deployed, supported, and commanded by a UN force commander and staff. Most UN
operations have a proven record of the sustainment and resolution of many African
conflicts, followed by peacebuilding. The UN has resources based on the financial
contributions of developed member states and combine developed countries’ military
resources with developing countries’ troops. A related option would be to train the
battalions of the most effective African militaries, such as Rwanda’s, which would
ensure the deployment of more capable African brigades.38
Ultimately, priority should be placed on effectiveness, with dependence on the
UN and the West, rather than suboptimal security with self-reliance through the
ASF concept. The ASF should remain a long-term goal; it could be fully operational
by 2020 or 2030. Under this more modest proposal, African peacekeepers would con-
tinue to be deployed with the authorization of the AU or subregional organizations
before being taken over by the UN. The UN would continue to assume control over
the operations and provide financing, logistics, and other resources.
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Healing Psychosocial Trauma in the
Midst of Truth Commissions: The Case
of Gacaca in Post-Genocide Rwanda
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Post-conflict governments and multilateral organizations have advocated truth
commissions since the end of the Cold War. The mandate of truth commissions
has been to combine the rule of law with psychosocial goals in the hope that they
will break systemic cycles of violence and facilitate reconciliation. While these com-
missions emphasize the dimensions of truth telling, apology, forgiveness, and recon-
ciliation, in practice, they are often challenged to fulfill the mandate of healing
psychosocial traumas through these dimensions in countries that suffer not only
from the traumatic experience of wars and genocide, but also from the multiple
psychosocial issues that result from these forms of mass violence. The present
article examines the psychosocial role of gacaca, a form of truth commission that
was introduced in post-genocide Rwanda in 2002, and argues that relying on
gacaca alone to heal psychosocial trauma in Rwanda underestimates the depth of
suffering that genocide created both at the individual and collective levels in
Rwandan communities. Writing as a Rwandan community-based mental health
researcher and practitioner concerned with the mental well-being of individuals
and communities that survive mass violence and genocide, I suggest that well-
assessed models adapted to the issues at hand should be considered to promote
the healing of psychosocial wounds and supplement the work of gacaca in the
rebuilding of peace and reconciliation in the country and in similar contexts else-
where. Mental well-being is central to the sustainable rebuilding and development
of countries recovering from wars and genocide.
Key words: truth commissions, gacaca, healing psychosocial trauma
Introduction
In a period of only 100 days, an estimated 800,000 Tutsi were murdered by their
Hutu neighbors in Rwanda. People were subjected to acts of physical and emotional
cruelty, rape, body mutilation, coerced participation in the murder of loved ones, and
forced mass displacement from their communities. Further, the genocide destroyed
many other aspects of life including the social networks that used to protect Rwandans
in times of adversity. Today, more than a decade later, Rwandans continue to face
multiple serious social issues including poverty, HIV/AIDS, collective trauma, injus-
tices, and interethnic tensions.
In 2002, Rwanda introduced the gacaca program as a form of truth commission
in the attempt to address both the legal and psychosocial consequences of the geno-
cide. Gacaca, which literally means ‘‘grass,’’ was used traditionally as a Rwandan
justice mechanism for dispute resolution to address issues related to property matters,
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inheritance, and family law.1 While the new form of gacaca has received praise for
being a home-grown approach, its ability to meet the psychosocial mandate has
been questioned.
The topic of truth commissions and their workings has been extensively dis-
cussed. The purpose of the present article is to expand our understanding of the
healing of psychosocial trauma through the different dimensions of truth commis-
sions in non-Western post-conflict situations and, in particular, the gacaca courts
in Rwanda. Although my aim is to demonstrate the challenges and limitations of
healing psychosocial trauma and offer some suggestions, my critical approach does
not intend to in any way minimize the role gacaca has played in the political and
economic restructuring of the country. Rather, I hope to raise awareness about the
dangers of placing unrealistic expectations on these commissions and assuming that
once they complete their work the affected individuals and communities will be able
to heal their psychosocial wounds. There is no magic bullet to make this happen.
The analysis and information shared in this article are both personal and aca-
demic. I am a genocide survivor born and raised in Rwanda. After the genocide, I
worked in the mental health sector in Rwanda before I moved to Canada in 2000. I
have followed the gacaca courts very closely through regular contacts with family,
friends, and colleagues, some of whom were directly involved in the preparation and
execution of the gacaca courts. I have traveled back to Rwanda every year and was
able to hear and read about what was happening in the country. I am a PhD candidate
focusing on community-based mental health research with an interest in alternative
models to individual-based approaches.
Wars and genocide create deep emotional and psychosocial wounds that require
well-examined techniques and skills and an extended period of time, all of which
must extend beyond the limited mandate of truth commissions and gacaca in particu-
lar. Psychosocial trauma in post-conflict situations can be understood from a structural
violence framework in that it combines individual emotional wounds with the social
suffering of communities. Psychosocial trauma links feelings about a past traumatic
experience of violence to issues of victimhood, guilt, and fear, which characterize
post-conflict situations.2 It encompasses the struggles of individuals and collectives
for systemic social transformation.3 When these struggles are nationwide and affect
different levels of social structures, a more holistic approach is advised.4 As several
scholars have shown, the immense and extremely complex psychosocial issues observed
in non-Western post-conflict situations extend beyond individual suffering, but there
has been a lack of models addressing individual and collective issues together. The
following section provides more details about healing psychosocial trauma through
truth commissions.
Healing Psychosocial Trauma through Truth Commissions
Wars and genocide result in major social issues—such as extreme poverty, physical
injuries, continued injustice, and violence—that often contribute to the deterioration
of the mental well-being of affected individuals and communities. Despite the stagger-
ing effects of mass violence, there has been a scarcity of mental health interven-
tions in many non-Western post-conflict situations, including the Rwandan Genocide.
The few existing interventions have been largely initiated and managed by non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) which operate with limited mandates. These
organizations have also been criticized for applying individual-based models that
are insensitive and inappropriate to the conditions of post-conflict societies.
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Truth commissions have been suggested as an alternative model to address these
gaps through their dual retributive and restorative approach. These commissions are
the most commonly used model of transitional justice that has been advocated by
post-conflict governments and multilateral organizations since the end of the Cold
War.5 The mandate of truth commissions is to combine the rule of law with psycho-
social goals in the hope that they will break systemic cycles of violence and facilitate
reconciliation.6 These commissions have been implemented in Latin American and
Eastern European countries and in African countries such as South Africa, Sierra
Leone, and Rwanda. Very recently, Canada also welcomed the truth-commission
approach to deal with the historic violence committed against the Aboriginal peoples
of Canada.
Truth commissions have become a well-established fixture on the global terrain of
human rights,7 which suggests that countries should address past wrongs by acknowl-
edging the pain inflicted upon a group or groups of citizens through brutality and
violence.8 Their dual role to address both legal and psychosocial trauma seemed
ideal in many post-conflict situations. Although they may differ according to the
particular conjunction of the political, cultural, and historical context of each coun-
try, they all tend to emphasize the dimensions of truth telling, apology, forgiveness,
and reconciliation. Gacaca shared these concepts with other truth commissions in its
mandate to heal and reunite Rwandans.
Healing Psychosocial Trauma through the Renewed Gacaca
Gacaca was inspired by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) in South
Africa in its legal and non-legal objectives. When the idea was introduced in Rwandan
communities, both ordinary men and women and local government leaders found the
hybrid nature of gacaca to combine legal and psychosocial objectives through truth
telling, peace, justice, healing, forgiveness, and reconciliation to be very appealing.9
For the first time since the end of genocide, a more familiar concept was brought
to their attention and ordinary Rwandans were asked to play an active role in it.
Rwanda, like other nations that witnessed persistent occurrences of violence, has
been categorized as a distressed and traumatized country alongside its citizens.
Since the end of genocide, many programs were conceptualized and supervised by
international organizations, excluding many Rwandans from the decisions about
the issues that concerned them in the first place. Programs that were initiated by
Rwandans tended to be considered illegitimate by people in positions of power and
international funders.
Many Rwandans were optimistic about the gacaca concept. Both Hutu and Tutsi
had high expectations for it; they hoped it could bring them back together and help
restore relationships. On the one hand, Tutsi survivors wished to know details about
how and where their family members had been killed and who had killed them. They
also wanted to at least have the perpetrators admit what they had done and apologize.
The Hutu also welcomed the gacaca idea and contributed to information gathering
in the hope that the truth would come out, set the innocent free, oblige the guilty to
acknowledge the suffering of the victims, who would offer forgiveness before guaran-
teeing a reduced sentence to those who confessed.10 Even those in jail expected repen-
tance and forgiveness. Many mental health practitioners like me and some of the
leading scholars in the field in Rwanda, such as Dr. Simon Gasibirege, judged gacaca
to be a promising alternative approach to the imported models that tended to focus
on the individual and ignore the collective nature of psychosocial trauma.
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In various villages in the country, informal gacaca gatherings similar to its
traditional model started taking place for small acts such as looting and destroying
property during the genocide. People were willing to do their part to repair some of
the damage done between neighbors. They collaborated with government workers by
providing information about what had happened during the genocide and participat-
ing in the election of the ‘‘inyangamugayo’’—‘‘the righteous’’ or those who were
trusted to play the role of judges during gacaca. I personally participated in these
elections and they seemed to be the most democratic elections I had ever attended.
The candidates stood in front of the voters who lined up behind the candidate of
their choice. Votes were counted and people went home peacefully. A good number
of prisoners started providing information about the whereabouts of the people that
they knew had been killed, and their surviving family members or former neighbors
were able to uncover their remains and bury them with dignity.
Mental health professionals offered input into the mechanisms that they judged
were needed to protect the mental well-being of Rwandans as they entered the pro-
cess of remembering, recounting, and hearing traumatizing information during the
hearings.11 Potential obstacles, especially the ability of the judges to handle the legal
and moral aspects of gacaca, were critically debated and recommendations about the
actions that could be taken before, during, and after the gacaca hearings were pro-
vided.12 The steps that were taken in preparation for the gacaca proceedings seemed
to head in the right direction to heal and reunite Rwandans.
Government officials also had high hopes for gacaca and viewed it as a model by
which to re-establish damaged relationships and unity.13 They wanted gacaca to be a
Rwandan process governed by Rwandans—‘‘a home-grown approach.’’
Although gacaca started as a grassroots approach governed by Rwandans in each
community, it shifted perspectives during its implementation and integrated a new
agenda to meet government demands. Over the course of the seven years since im-
plementation, participation was no longer driven by the excitement and motivation
that characterized the preparatory stage; it became a top-down approach14 and it
faced increased suspicion and safety issues. Survivors who had hoped to share their
suffering and other community members who had agreed to testify feared for their
lives as they started receiving threats and experienced further exclusion. Many geno-
cide suspects who had intended to confess started manipulating facts and evidence,
which often resulted in a further prison sentence that could go up to 25 years. Those
who were released on the condition of compensating the survivors for the material
losses ended up doing community work, called ‘‘Travaux d’Inte´reˆt Ge´ne´raux’’ (TIG),
which they resented and which did not benefit those who had lost everything to the
genocide.
While the above realities might have benefited the government’s political and
economic restructuring, the gacaca implementation has not offered satisfying results
to the mass Rwandan population or to outside evaluators who criticized gacaca for
its limitations to carry out legal trials and its inability to reconcile Rwandans.
Many of these critiques have often been directed at the Rwandan government and
the model itself. Truth commissions are bound to fail when they are imposed from
above.
In contrast with such criticism, I argue that the whole conceptualization of truth
commissions is flawed in regard to the dual mandate of retribution and restoration.
Inevitable incongruent expectations and weak outcomes result from the lack of
clarity about activities that are organized to fulfill both the retributive and restorative
goals. The lack of contextualization and consideration of the complex realities of the
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countries and communities in which truth commissions are implemented is also
troubling because it can result in more harm than good. The following is an example
of the complex contextual issues that I witnessed first-hand.
First-hand Experience of Gacaca
In the summer of 2007, I decided to attend a gacaca session. Many people I met over
the course of that trip greeted me with statements such as ‘‘Did you know that this
person has been released?’’ or ‘‘Today is a gacaca day and you cannot do anything
today, you go to the hearings, or do nothing else.’’ Once a week in every village, all
work stopped so that all citizens can concentrate on the local gacaca hearings. The
sense of urgency and concern in what I was hearing urged me to take part in what
was happening. In order to gain a better understanding of these proceedings, I
decided to attend gacaca in my home village. The community members had gathered
in different neighborhood-based groups in various cells. After a long period dedicated
to paperwork preparation and registration to ascertain who was present at the
session, the villagers were instructed to sit in a circle in front of four judges to
facilitate the process. Like in other communities, these judges had been elected by
their fellow community members. A group of suspected perpetrators stood nearby.
Some of them were prisoners dressed in pink uniforms and others were community
members who had been listed as suspects but were still living in their respective
communities.
The hearing on that day focused on four men accused of attacking the home of
a woman of about 75 years of age at the time of the hearings. She had lost her
husband and seven of her ten children. It was shocking to hear that one of her
surviving children from a previous relationship with a Hutu man was among the
accused. During the session, each of the accused men was asked to give a personal
account of his role in what had happened to the woman. Their statements were
more of a form of self-defense than a testimony. A few individual witnesses were
then asked to either confirm or disconfirm the alleged facts. The elderly woman was
among the witnesses and she seemed disoriented when judges asked her to focus on
facts and not tell her story as she understood it. Although nobody seemed to deny
what had happened to her and her family, there were problems in explaining how it
had happened and who should be held responsible. For more than four hours, the
community members witnessed the hearing in silence, moving their eyes back and
forth between the accused and the witnesses. This sense of hopelessness was troubling
because in other situations people do not stand by and watch emotionlessly; they do
something about it. When I lived in Rwanda, some neighbors who wronged my family
and felt guilty about what they had done expressed remorse in various ways (for
example, by offering to help on the land, offering small gifts at a wedding, or return-
ing stolen furniture). These cultural gestures offered a window for communication
and they made us not feel so alone after the genocide. Other than a few survivors
who guided the elderly woman from one group of defendants to the next and under
the order of the judges, nothing else moved. Was the genocide experience being
relived? Was this a conspiracy to silence or was it a silenced community in the face
of the legality that tends to dominate social processes such as gacaca? Or was it
dissociation from the agony felt around this community? This silent witnessing can
be interpreted in different ways. As a Rwandan interested in the participatory and
dynamic action of individuals and collectives for their healing, on that day, I witnessed
a disciplined community rather than an active group of excited participants.
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This experience seemed to reflect the many stories I have heard from Rwandan
women who confided in me that they were unable to bring up the issues that troubled
them the most, such as rape, at these gacaca hearings. They were not allowed to say
anything related to rape because doing so could lead the rapist ge´nocidaire back to
prison and in turn be considered as a crime committed by these women. Further,
they did not see any support from the judges or other community members. This
may explain the prevalence of many traumatic crises, suicidal attempts, and even
occasional uncontrollable threatening statements during gacaca sessions instead of
dialogical expressions. Silence is very damaging, especially for those whose suffering
is not given value.
Scholars who examined the psychosocial aspects of truth commissions argue that
gacaca did not result in positive outcomes,15 partly because of the top-down approach
that the government adopted halfway through the hearings. Phil Clark, who spent
an extensive period of time in Rwanda observing and recording the gacaca proceed-
ings, offers evidence that the Rwandan government closely controlled the functioning
of due process to the point of having officials intervene to correct the judges’ state-
ments, halt disruptive behavior in the general assembly, or interpret back to the
participants what the testimonies meant.16 Although Clark judges that such actions
were not generalizable, he acknowledges the impact that these interferences had on
the desired open space in which dialogue was needed to enhance non-legal ends—the
psychosocial goals of gacaca.
A close examination of truth commissions reveals that gacaca is not alone in the
struggle to meet psychosocial needs. As the analysis of the different dimensions
advocated by truth commissions will show, the inhibition of the psychosocial com-
ponent is a commonly shared concern except in places where the locally initiated
approaches assumed the risk of not seeking legitimacy from the top social structures
of society (e.g., the Peruvian integration of the Senderistas in the Ayacucho region).17
To me, these concerns reside in the whole conceptualization of truth commissions,
which combines retributive and restorative justice and fails to critically consider the
meaning and implications of each dimension in the work of truth commissions.
In the following section I pay particular attention to these dimensions, including
truth telling, apology, forgiveness, and reconciliation. Accountability, public acknowl-
edgment, and apology are all forms of recognizing the wrong done and promising to
not repeat past mistakes. I use apology as the term most commonly used in truth
commissions. Reconciliation will not be examined as a separate concept because the
other dimensions are part of the reconciliation process.
Truth Telling
Truth commissions have considered truth telling to be an important dimension of
addressing the legal issues and psychosocial trauma that result from mass vio-
lence. With a concentration on truth telling, Alex Boraine postulates that the telling
of stories about dehumanizing acts can be publicly received with dignity when
relayed in a poignant manner.18 He also asserts that truth commissions challenge
people who deliberately ignore the suffering inflicted on others to stop saying that
they did not know.19 Instead, they are offered the opportunity to cooperate with sur-
vivors who are seeking the truth about what happened to their loved ones. Cathartic
reactions to testimonies are thought to facilitate the transition from a wounded to
a healed individual; the effects of the testimonies presumably impact those who do
not have a chance to testify. Truth telling is also believed to consist of narratives
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or expressions of a collectively shared understanding of the past gained from individ-
uals’ different levels of witnessing.20 However, Mendeloff argues that truth telling
through testimonies is very hard to prove empirically because it is subjective; human
beings always remember and relate stories from a spatially and temporally limited
perspective.21
From a political point of view, truth telling is a tool to break the cycle of silence
surrounding mass violence so that people cannot claim ignorance.22 Pumla Gobodo-
Madikizela argues that these commissions allow for a reflection on one’s own role in
the past and the capacity to confront and acknowledge the wrong done and, in turn,
this should lead to reaching out to others in the attempt to repair broken relation-
ships. Using the example of South Africa, she explains that the TRC created a space
for people to come together to forge a peaceful society by sharing their pain, grief,
anger, and resentment, emotions that are associated with a history of violence in a
reflective dialogue. She adds that the public spaces open to the TRC hearings were
sufficiently intimate to allow some acts of recognition, apology, and forgiveness.23
Michael Humphrey, on the contrary, finds troubling the adoption of psychoanalytic
language which proposes that revealing is healing and that unresolved memory of
past violence can be overcome by remembering, telling, and forgetting.24
According to my observations from gacaca and the anecdotal stories heard from
people who have participated in it, telling and listening to testimonies was not done
as a form of dialogue because it did not engage the community participants who
witnessed in silence. It seemed to me that the environment was actually unsafe for
those testifying and the defendants who had to prove their innocence in regard to the
accusations made against them. When offering testimonies or defensive replies, the
accused and the offended addressed the judges who had the ultimate power to decide
the outcome of the proceedings.
Researchers who followed gacaca hearings in Rwanda and had opportunities to
interview some of its participants reported that actually telling or giving testimony
during the gacaca hearings had a negative impact on the psychological well-being of
those involved. In a study conducted on gacaca, Katherine Broune´us demonstrates
that survivors who testified in the gacaca were 20% and 40% more likely to suffer
from depression and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), respectively, than sur-
vivors who had not done so. Among the inyangamugayo (the judges) or neighbors,
the effect of bearing witness emerged even more strongly as the relative risks of
suffering from depression and PTSD, respectively, were 60% and 75% higher among
those who had testified in the gacaca compared to those who had not.25 Participants
also reported feelings of greater insecurity and fear after testifying as well as physical
and other psychological difficulties immediately before, during, and after their testi-
monies, including shaking uncontrollably, fainting, and intense feelings of isolation.26
Studies on emotions such as shame and guilt have shown high patterns of unique
relationships between emotions and motivations when participants were asked to
recall ‘‘other-caused events,’’ whereas feelings of anger, sadness, and anxiety were
closely interrelated with the ‘‘self-caused event.’’27 Similarly, in a case study concen-
trating on one particular community Max Rettig found that the healing aspect of
truth telling was rather questionable as participants gave false testimonies to seek
revenge for grievances related or unrelated to genocide. Rettig showed, for instance,
that some community members wrongfully accused others as a result of marital
affairs or land-based conflicts while others did it to avoid severe punishment or
threats.28 Of the three elements of truth telling, truth hearing, and truth shaping,
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Clark found truth telling to be the most problematic. Suspects and their allies told
lies to protect themselves or their loved ones, simply hid evidence, or went even
further to threaten survivors to not tell what they knew.29 Yet, there were no coun-
selors available to support those who experienced emotional distress resulting from
the gacaca hearings.
Apology
Apology is another concept that has been greatly emphasized in truth commissions
as the morally ‘‘right thing to do.’’ It consists of acknowledging injustice, expressing
regret, and accepting responsibility, including material or financial compensation.
Sincere apology is a critical factor in restoring broken relationships.30 According to
Allan el al., genuine apology should go beyond general verbal apologies to incorporate
apologetic behavior that reflects the wrongdoers’ degree of sincerity as the victims
perceive it.31 For full-fledged completion, a genuine apology must elicit acceptable
signs of empathy on the part of the offended party.32 In the form of accountability,
apology can range from sincere acknowledgment of the wrong done and expression
of regret to material or monetary compensation or other forms of punishment, such
as imprisonment.
While truth commissions place a great deal of emphasis on the process of apology,
this concept has often been discouraged by a legal system in which offenders mani-
pulate or deny facts in order to avoid any form of accountability. Concentrating on
factual truth and other simple forms of public acknowledgment and reluctantly
incorporating apologetic measures hinders the very nature of what apology means
in a healing sense.33
In places like Peru, where the unrest is rooted in decades of animosity, com-
pensation has been considered unreasonable.34 In other countries where truth com-
missions recognize the importance of material compensation, financial compensation
is seldom provided as a form of recognition of the injustice and pain inflicted on the
victims, with a common excuse of insufficient funds. In places where mass violence
was sponsored by the state, financial apology is seen as the responsibility of the
government (e.g., South Africa).
In gacaca courts, however, compensation has been a burden on individual offenders
rather than the state. Because of the poverty of many of the frontline killers, individ-
uals who cannot afford monetary compensation do community work, known as TIG,
such as repair of the roads or other tasks related to the public interest and not to the
individual victims, many of whom also live in extreme poverty. This approach has
left both the victims and the perpetrators dissatisfied by the outcomes of gacaca,
thereby creating the perception of another form of injustice. While community work
is good for all, survivors resent the fact that the government has done very little to
help them rebuild their lives and the houses that were destroyed during the geno-
cide. At the same time, the accused resent and blame the victims for what they
view as exploitative punishment. In this context, the process of apology becomes
overwhelmed by emotions of fear, anger, and resentment, and has little social space
to offer sincere apology and forgiveness.
Within the context of healing emotional wounds, the process of apology entails
emotional work on the part of the different parties in the conflict, who must cope
with guilt, shame, anger, and pity.35 The manner in which apology is expressed
influences the nature of the response offered by the injured party. There is a lack
of empirical studies on the process of apology in the context of truth commissions.
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However, studies done on the concept of apology in social contexts other than truth
commissions show that when offenders deny their offense and try to justify their
wrongdoing—or ignore, avoid, or exclude the offended—they develop instances of
active or passive dissociation36 or disengagement. These attitudes may indicate
a lack of accountability on the part of the perpetrators which, in turn, can evoke
more negative reactions from the offended and augment threats to attempts at re-
establishing peace.
Although many truth commissions are theoretically supposed to enhance apologetic
statements, they do not offer the necessary circumstances for emotions to be ex-
pressed and processed so that genuine apology can take place. Rather, commissions
often focus on testimonies, especially the perpetrators’ accounts, to provide facts of
the mass violence that occurred and not on the intense climate that testifying may
create. Kanyangara et al.’s assessment of the emotional climate and intergroup per-
ceptions involving a group of survivors and prisoners accused of genocide crimes
in Rwanda showed that gacaca hearings heightened negative perceptions which
then prevailed for an extended period of time.37 Emotions of sadness, fear, disgust,
insecurity, and shame increased during the course of the hearings, especially for
survivors. Prisoners who accepted their role in the genocide during gacaca hearings
reported feeling an intensified sense of guilt.
Granting the perpetrators amnesty when their testimonies match the evidence
sought by the commissioners has also posed problems and raised questions about
whose justice is being sought. The amnesties are often detached from remorse for
the violation of victims’ rights. Nevertheless, the victims of violence are required to
accept the amnesty, which creates another obstacle on the journey toward forgive-
ness and hinders opportunities to obtain the desired psychosocial relief and benefits.
Research shows that people who go through formalistic processes of apology such
as amnesty or insincere apology may later regret having apologized or experience anger
and protest their innocence by blaming the victims for the violence that occurred.38
Genuine apology constitutes an important foundation for forgiveness39 and a two-
way emotional process of giving and receiving. The presumed offenders feel relieved
when they are able to express their regrets and shame about the wrong done, and
the offended similarly experience relief from the pain endured when their offenders
genuinely admit the wrong done. Unfortunately, this mutual communion of pain
and emotion that transforms the affected individuals into renewed individuals who
can in turn share the gift of forgiveness is missing from many truth commissions
including the gacaca courts.
Forgiveness
The topic of forgiveness has also been adopted as a dimension of truth commissions.
Forgiveness and reconciliation, like truth telling and apology, are interpreted differently
according to different disciplines such as theology and some branches of psychology,
including social psychology and, more recently, peace psychology. From a psycho-
social perspective, the concept of authentic forgiveness is embedded in inner and
outer factors. In this section, I examine the factors that influence forgiveness both
at the individual (inner) and external (outer) levels.
At the individual level, research identifies narcissism as a major intrinsic factor
that hinders forgiveness and psychosocial well-being.40 Narcissistic individuals tend
to concentrate their efforts on the self and self-interests. They are easily offended
and often preoccupied with defending their rights and requiring legal justice to be
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rendered after harmful events. For the narcissists, transgression is a debt that must
be paid and forgiveness is costly and morally unacceptable. Their unforgiving nature
can lead to anger, anxiety, and other negative emotions, especially when society sug-
gests acts of forgiveness after painful experiences. The interpersonal and psychologi-
cal anxiety observed in narcissistic individuals tends to be negatively correlated with
social connectedness41 and tends to make the narcissists prone to mental health
issues.
At the external level, factors that influence forgiveness include sociocultural and
political variables. One of the conditions of belonging to a certain group is to accept
group behaviors and attitudes that separate. In-group and out-group categorizations
consist of showing favoritism toward group members and denigrating members of
the out-group.42 In such a context, forgiving someone from an opposing group can
threaten in-group cohesion or the individual right to choice. Studies of in-group and
out-group relations find the process of forgiveness to be influenced by the level of
regard in-group members have for out-group members. Stangor et al., in fact, showed
that belonging to a group with high negative attitudes toward members of the out-
group hinders the willingness to forgive.43
In the case of post-conflict situations, these categorizations are understood differ-
ently. When mass violence is conceptualized as a general human tragedy, people are
more forgiving and less inclined to assign collective guilt to the opposing group.44 A
recent study conducted by Cehajic et al. with high school and university students
in Bosnia and Herzegovina showed that when students identified themselves as
Bosnian they showed reduced social distance from the out-group, greater tendency
toward forgiveness, and increased trust in the other group in conflict.45 In contrast,
other studies found that competitive victimhood and a high level of in-group iden-
tification discourage the forgiveness of members of the out-group, especially when
in-group membership has links with political membership.46
An empirical understanding of forgiveness is crucial to psychosocial healing in
the work of truth commissions. However, this dimension tends to take a legal or
theological approach without considering the psychological needs of those who are
involved and the complexity of the issues at hand. For instance, although forgiveness
is said to be a part of the work of truth commissions, it is often excluded from the
planned activities of truth commissions. When it is used, it is driven by motives and
outcomes other than that of healing emotional wounds. Chapman’s study on the TRC
showed that some people participated in the hearing because they wished to discover
the truth about human rights violations and the perpetrators. Others testified to tell
their stories, gain public acknowledgment, or have their names cleared.47 Clark, in his
multiple interviews in Rwanda about gacaca, found that forgiveness was often per-
formed through public confessions that involved the accused and the public prosecu-
tor representing the state rather than the opposed parties in the conflict.48 While
these types of apology are often viewed as symbolic, their genuineness is question-
able when there is no dialogue between those involved in the process.
Gacaca encouraged people to reconsider their situations and role in the genocide
and the process itself. Some may even have attended after going through a personal
process in the attempt to overcome the hurt. However, these initiatives seem to have
been dashed when offenders did not come forward to tell the truth and apologize. My
brother, who was severely cut with machetes several times, attended a session in
which the person responsible for his attack was being tried. When I asked him
what it was like to stand face-to-face with a man who left him for dead, he told me
the following:
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Before I went to the gacaca, I traced the journey I took on the day I was attacked.
Then I identified two people I needed to forgive if they accepted to receive my forgive-
ness: the woman who shouted when I tried to hide behind her hut, and the man who
attacked me first with his machete. . . . [T]he woman came forward and kneeled down
to apologize again and again. But the man lied and then did not make any effort to
acknowledge what he did to me. I forgave the woman and took back my forgiveness
from the man when he failed to express remorse.
Some people might have the ability to juxtapose positive emotions with the negative
emotions associated with the offense, move past their negative emotions, and even
establish peaceful coexistence with their offenders. This kind of forgiveness, however,
is very fragile because the root problem of disagreement remains untouched. This
kind of forgiveness does not provide a good foundation on which to rebuild strong
relationships, and feelings of animosity can be easily revived toward self or others
when there is no opportunity to hear how the damage done affects the lives of people
in a conflict.
Other people use religious forgiveness to obtain peace, especially when forgiveness
is motivated by the ‘‘forgive and forget’’ idea and when violence is committed by
members of the same community. When forgiveness becomes imposed as a require-
ment for maintaining peaceful coexistence and fails to repair broken relationships
between the offender and the offended, it lends to the fragile state of peace, in oppo-
sition to true forgiveness which allows negative emotions—such as anger, resent-
ment, the desire for revenge, and other negative emotions toward the offender—to
be released.49 True forgiveness goes beyond the exoneration of the out-group from
past injuries with the expectation that direct engagement with the out-group and
reconciliatory processes will follow.50
It is well known that in many divided societies people form new social categories
based on shared experiences and other types of in-group identification such as
ethnicity, race, or gender. The question to ask is whether truth commissions, in their
mandate to facilitate forgiveness, try to minimize this divide between in-group and
out-group membership. In many countries where truth commissions have been pro-
moted there is a great emphasis on victims and perpetrators as two opposing groups
in the conflict. This black and white dichotomy is problematic at times when the
perpetrator in one incident becomes the victim in the other. To recall the elderly
woman I mentioned earlier, her son who committed genocide was also a brother to
the half siblings who were killed in the genocide. In situations such as this one, the
hurt can be very deep and the accusations and defensive testimonies can complicate
the gacaca process and cause further psychosocial problems.
The exploration of each of the above dimensions provides a theoretical and em-
pirical understanding of the dimensions and the challenges they pose to the concep-
tualization and implementation of truth commissions. The lack of critical consideration
of these dimensions has moral causes that are often ignored in the analysis of the truth
commissions. These include false promises and a lack of concern about the impact of
truth commissions on the psychosocial well-being of individuals and communities.
False Promises
False promises involve, simply put, promising things that truth commissions are un-
able to achieve. This practice is notable in the combination of retributive and restora-
tive justice models—two approaches rooted in dichotomous philosophical frame-
works. Retributive justice, rooted in legal justice and supported by the liberal
human rights tradition, is not an equalizing discourse. Although this approach seeks
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to punish the offender and vindicate the victim,51 it does not always offer opportunities
to explore the problems that caused violence or the resulting complex issues, such as
psychosocial trauma. Restorative justice, on the other hand, originates from moral
and religious discourse52 and encourages the restoration of relationships and involves
apology, forgiveness, and reconciliation between individuals and groups.
The combination of opposing perspectives in one intervention model has been
considered a political strategy to manage post-conflict societies but is unsatisfying
at the psychosocial level. In fact, in theory, truth commissions seem to lean toward
a restorative approach. However, in practical terms, balancing retributive justice
with restorative and reconciliation processes has been a struggle.
During the proceedings, gacaca became more retributive than restorative, and
the collected facts were used to prosecute the wrongdoers rather than restore rela-
tionships through the processes of apology and forgiveness. Anecdotal reports about
gacaca reveal that the complicated cases that lasted more than one session were
often cases that presented complex legal challenges and not reconciliatory processes.
While the initial preparatory activities tended to emphasize the restorative ap-
proach, gacaca was transformed over the course of its implementation into a top-
down approach charged to meet the mandate of the state and not of the people.
Consequently, it fell into the trap of state-driven goals imposed from above, which
is common in many truth commissions.53
At the beginning, gacaca was praised for being unique in that it countered the
top-down approach by involving the local population in electing their own judges,
actively participating in the collection of facts, and testifying during the proceed-
ings.54 Both Hutu and Tutsi were chosen as judges. While people tend to think that
the implementation did not go so well, the conceptualization of gacaca also presented
initial contradictions about what it ought to achieve and how it ought to do so.
For instance, the collection of facts was not as truthful as expected.55 The accused
frequently gave evasive testimonies in order to cover up their own deeds or those of
family members by admitting to minor crimes while attributing more serious violent
acts to those who had died or disappeared. At the government level, the collection of
facts about past wrongs contradicted the information that had been used to motivate
people to participate in gacaca. The written objectives of this form of truth commis-
sion emphasized prosecution,56 whereas people were told that it was reconciliation
that was being sought. These conceptual and practical contradictions are a reflection
of the moral issues related to the whole process. It is of no surprise that those
involved both locally and nationally said they were doing one thing while actually
doing exactly the opposite of what was expected.
Caring Less about Re-traumatization
Asking people to relive traumatic experiences without adequate and appropriate sup-
port in place and trying to achieve on the social level what the psychological models
attempt to accomplish on an individual level might actually be more traumatizing
than healing.57 The TRC, which is upheld as a role model for other truth commis-
sions, has itself been criticized for underestimating the extent of the psychological
impact of public testimonies of the acts of violence committed during the apartheid
regime in South Africa.58 According to Allan, the initial draft of the TRC did not
have a plan to support witnesses who had to relive their traumatic past through testi-
monies.59 Even when the testimonies were recognized as potentially re-traumatizing
and psychologists were invited to help, the support was restricted to individuals who
had given testimonies and not those who heard them. In actuality, testimonies of
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mass violence can be traumatic for both the witnesses and the public who follow
these unfolding stories in silence.
These testimonies can even have dramatic effects when the facilitators of the
process, and judges in the case of gacaca, lack facilitation skills for complex and
traumatizing processes (e.g., traumatic crises). In Rwanda, the elected judges received
basic training in legal prosecution and not in healing processes and mediating complex
cases. While this kind of training was in many ways insufficient and inadequate, it
did not prevent the judges from making legal decisions that took precedence over
the reconciliatory goals that the gacaca initiatives aimed to accomplish. Anecdotal
evaluations of this process by older Rwandans who understood the difference be-
tween the old and new gacaca found the new one to be an instrument of the state
influenced by international donors. Rather than a psychosocial grassroots inter-
vention, gacaca, like many other truth commissions, became what Teitel calls ‘‘a
bureaucratic response to bureaucratic murder’’60 that is driven by political and
economic restructuring and governance.
In old gacaca, the neutral and respected members of the community who were
invited to resolve a particular issue met at the scene where the wrong had been
done. The process included hearing the explanations of the parties involved in the
conflict, collecting factual evidence from observation, and hearing the testimony of
witnesses. Rather than imposing punishment, the two parties were given an oppor-
tunity to express their feelings and needs, and through a negotiation process they
agreed on compensation for the wrong done. Other community members were not
silent witnesses. They participated in the discussions and even helped negotiate the
compensation. If the offender did not have the means to compensate the victim for
the wrong done, other members offered some assistance. Assessment of the wrong
done was always followed by a recognition of responsibility and an apology. The
process was accompanied by rituals of shaking hands and sharing a drink which
was purchased by both parties and sometimes other community members. The resto-
ration of the broken relationship was an important outcome of this old grassroots
form of gacaca. The involvement of the community in the process was a sign of
solidarity. The old gacaca model resembles other grassroot approaches observed in
post-conflict countries, such as Peru,61 and East Timor’s village-based Community
Reconciliation Procedures (CRPs).62 Although these approaches tend to apply method-
ologies that bring local people together to challenge individual-based models and use
sociocultural resources to repair the damage done, they often lack legitimacy and the
methods they propose often remain understudied. The following section offers some
suggestions on how psychosocial healing can be approached through an emphasis on
grassroot-based truth commissions.
Suggestions for Healing Psychosocial Trauma through Truth
Commissions and Gacaca
The action of remembering and telling stories of violence is necessary to stop the
cycles of violence that threaten livelihood in post-conflict societies. Breaking the
silence that surrounds mass violence through public testimonies is important both
politically and socially. Truth commissions can continue to offer an alternative to
individual legal and psychological approaches. The collection of stories of violence
and the use of case presentations as a way to recognize the pain inflicted and the
failure of the state to protect its citizens should be encouraged for public acknowledg-
ment. However, the institution in charge of truth commissions in each country
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should focus on the needs of the people and determine what actions must be taken
based on the results of assessments. This would limit unrealistic expectations and
false hopes and allow the process to build on the local resources that can remain in
place once the commissions complete their work.
Local governments and external supporters have the responsibility to ensure
security and the rule of law and to acknowledge the impact of mass violence on the
psychosocial well-being of individuals and their communities. Local people should be
identified as key players in the healing of their own trauma and the rebuilding of
their communities. Affected individuals need to be aware of the suffering of other
community members on all sides of a conflict. The depth and extent of healing will
depend to a high degree on the willingness of individuals to mobilize other commu-
nity members and share resources through social and psychological group processes.
Initiating a truth commission managed by local citizens does not mean the local
citizens in charge (i.e., judges elected for gacaca courts) need training only in legal
matters, which tended to be the case in Rwanda. I suggest that the individuals
trusted to be fair in their judgment should also receive other kinds of training that
empower them to do their job right. One of the issues with which truth commissions
have experienced difficulties is the ability to address the different forms of violence
embedded in different levels of social structures. One way to address these forms of
violence would be to encourage local people to identify equalizing coping mechanisms
and rituals that extend beyond the borders of existing social categorizations. As
explained above, in traditional gacaca some rituals were more restorative than the
judgment itself. However, the renewed gacaca has tended to focus on what divides
people rather than on what unites them. Rituals can facilitate the creation of the
space needed for breaking the silence that paralyzes those whose identities have
been violated and can enhance psychosocial healing.
Conclusion
In this article, I discussed the different dimensions that demonstrate the lack of
careful conceptualization of truth commissions and gacaca in particular. Although
some of these dimensions involve legal and psychosocial aspects (e.g., truth telling
and different forms of accountability), each of them should be well-studied in terms
of its legal and psychosocial aspects and within the context of the concerned post-
conflict society in order to set up appropriate and achievable objectives. The process
of their implementation should also be carefully scrutinized and it should build on
existing resources and mechanisms. For instance, some people had managed to settle
some of the conflicts related to the genocide event by telling the truth about what
happened, compensating according to one’s means, and even repairing some broken
relationships. The implementation of gacaca in each region should have used these
instances as examples to encourage other community members to do the same.
On a concluding note, the healing of psychosocial trauma cannot start and finish
with truth commissions or other imposed models.63 The different dimensions of truth
commissions can help bring about justice and heal psychosocial trauma if carefully
conceptualized and implemented. The active involvement of the local people and the
use of local resources are crucial to the achievement of healing psychosocial trauma
in post-conflict situations and post-genocide Rwanda. The creation of a contained
space, the use of local unifying rituals that are oriented toward social justice, and
good facilitation skills can help manage the overwhelming emotions and change
affected communities from broken and divided ones into healing communities.
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From Bloodless Revolution to Bloody
Counterrevolution:
The Adana Massacres of 19091
Bedross Der Matossian
University of Nebraska/Lincoln
The historiography of the Adana Massacres of 1909 is represented by two diverg-
ing views. While some Turkish scholars deny the involvement of the local govern-
ment officials in the massacres by putting all of the blame on the Armenians who
revolted as part of a conspiracy to establish a kingdom in Cilicia, some Armenian
scholars, whose work is overshadowed by the Armenian genocide, accuse the Com-
mittee of Union and Progress (CUP) of acting behind the scenes to destroy the
Armenian economic infrastructure in Adana in order to curb any future political
and economic development in the area. By deviating from the existing historio-
graphy, the present article contends that the Adana Massacres should be viewed
as part of the revolutionary process which led to the erosion of social and political
stability in the region, the creation of weak public-sphere institutions, and intensi-
fication of the existing economic anxieties, all of which led to the enactment of
violence against the vulnerable Armenian population of Adana. Understanding
the factors and the motives that led to the enactment of violence will shed new
light on understanding the future acts of violence perpetrated against the indige-
nous Armenian population of the Ottoman Empire.
Key words: Ottoman Empire, violence, revolution, massacres, Armenians,
public sphere
On 29 August 1908, one month after the Young Turk Revolution, Mihrdat Noradoun-
gian, an Armenian intellectual from Istanbul, wrote a lengthy opinion piece entitled
‘‘The Price of Freedom’’ in the Armenian daily newspaper Puzantion. In this lengthy
article, Noradoungian argued that people were looking with hesitation at this freedom
that came about without any bloodshed. What Noradoungian was implying in the
article is that the Freedom after the revolution should have been received through
violence—probably reminiscent of the violence during the French Revolution which
was able to get rid of the ancien re´gime:
The change that took place a month ago had the biggest peculiar advantage, to which
the entire world views with bewilderment, and that is the lack of blood and uproar.
Both of these factors are regular phenomenon in these kinds of situations. . . Though
during the [last] 15 years a lot of blood has spilled, there was the fear of greater
bloodshed which did not happen. One should know that this [bloodshed] has become
a natural law and that natural laws are unavoidable. Whatever did not happen in the
beginning could still happen. Whatever the revolution did not do, the counterrevolu-
tion will be able to do. There is only one way in order to prevent the occurrence of
this contingency (bloodshed) and that is discretion, modesty, wisdom, and patience.
New freedom is always fragile. Let us be careful.2
Bedross Der Matossian, ‘‘From Bloodless Revolution to Bloody Counterrevolution: The Adana
Massacres of 1909.’’ Genocide Studies and Prevention 6, 2 (August 2011): 152–173. 6 2011
Genocide Studies and Prevention. doi:10.3138/gsp.6.2.152
This connection between Revolution, Blood, and the ancien re´gime was endemic and
not only to the Armenian press in the Ottoman Empire. During the first days of
the constitution, while the revolutionary festivities were at their height, the ethnic
presses (Armenian, Arabic, Greek, Ottoman Turkish, and Ladino, among others)
warned people to be vigilant about the existing fragile situation and be wary of
former officials of the ancien re´gime.3 However, in comparison to other newspapers,
the Armenian press dealt intensively with the concept of the ancien re´gime in its
present form, not in its past one.4 One such editorial sought to enlighten the public
about the danger of the situation and the calamities that they should expect.5 The
article is crucial in that it predicts the upcoming calamity of the counterrevolution.
It advised Armenians to not create any pretext for the eruption of these agitations.
On the contrary, the editorial argued that it is the duty of the Armenians to act with
love toward their Turkish brothers and be careful with every act and every word that
could make them bitter against Armenians and incite the people of the ancien
re´gime. ‘‘We repeat that we need to be careful from shouting ‘Armenian,’ or to talk
about an independent Armenia,’’ argued the editorial. ‘‘The majority of the nation is in
agreement that reforming the condition of the Armenians of Turkey is dependent on the
reform of Turkey.’’ The editorial ends by recommending that Armenians cooperate
with their Turkish compatriots ‘‘who support us and curse the ancien re´gime.’’6
With this connection between revolution and blood in mind, the present article
discusses the correlation between the 1908 revolution and the Adana Massacres of
1909. After briefly reviewing the existing historiography of the Adana Massacres, I
will introduce a new approach to the understanding of these massacres in the larger
context of the revolution, specifically the development of a weak public sphere and
the erosion of social and political stability, all of which led to the escalation of
violence in Adana. Afterward, I will discuss the impact of the Young Turk Revolution
on Adana and demonstrate the ways in which the revolution precipitated the ethnic
tensions leading to the massacres.
The Young Turk Revolution of 1908
The Young Turk Revolution of 1908 represents an important historical juncture in
Ottoman history and the history of the modern Middle East, not as a new beginning,
but rather as a major catalyst in accelerating the dissolution of the empire. Thus,
these two contradicting paradigms of a new beginning and dissolution were inter-
connected and went hand in hand in marking the last phase of Ottoman history,
the Second Constitutional Period (1908–1918) that ended with the defeat of the
empire in World War I. Within this period two interrelated events took place that
shaped the political scene of the era: (1) The counterrevolution of 31 March 1909
which was initiated by the reactionary forces within the empire and (2) the Adana
Massacres (April 14–17, April 25–27) which led to the destruction of the physical
and the material presence of Armenians in Adana.
The counterrevolution was not a spontaneous outburst by dissatisfied elements
in Istanbul; rather, it was organized by oppositional elements mainly represented
by conservative religious circles within the empire.7 On the night of April 12, the
troops of the First Army Corps mutinied and marched toward Ayasofya Square,
near the parliament, accompanied by a large number of people in religious garb
(softas) shouting slogans in favor of the sultan and demanding the restoration of
the Sher’ia.8 This resulted in the resignation of Hilmi Pas¸a’s cabinet, which was
promptly accepted by the sultan.9 By royal order, on April 14, Tevfik Pas¸a was
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appointed the Grand Vezir and Ismail Kemal was elected the President of Parlia-
ment.10 This was a huge blow to the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) whose
members either fled or were hiding. On April 17 the CUP began to act. The Action
Army (Haraket Ordusu) left Salonika and headed to Istanbul to restore public order
and discipline among the rebellious troops. It established its headquarters at Aya
Stefanos and began negotiations with the new cabinet.11 After failed negotiations,
the Action Army entered Istanbul on April 23 and, after several skirmishes, took
control of the city.
The Adana Massacres of 1909, which became a turning point for the Armenians
living in the Ottoman Empire, were one of the earliest manifestations of violence
during the Second Constitutional Period (1908–1918). Furthermore, the massacres
represent a microcosm of the deterioration of ethnic conflict in Anatolia and its
culmination in the destruction of the indigenous Armenian population during World
War I. Understanding the factors and motives that led to the enactment of violence
will shed new light on the future acts of violence perpetrated against the indigenous
Armenian population of the Ottoman Empire. The present article contends that the
Adana Massacres should be viewed as an integral part of the ongoing power struggle
in Anatolia and the Arab provinces after the revolution.12 An important factor that
contributed to the escalation of ethnic tensions was the emergence of a weak public
sphere within the empire after thirty years of the Hamidian despotic regime. Hence,
to better understand the escalation of ethnic tensions in the empire, it is important
to problematize the notion of modern public sphere and understand its implications
and challenges within the Ottoman milieu.13 Doing so will provide us with better
ways of understanding communal violence as a by-product of modernity.
The Public Sphere and the Ottoman Empire
The notion of the public sphere refers to a social space in which private citizens
gather as a public body with the rights of assembly, association, and expression in
order to form public opinion.14 The history of the notion of the public sphere in the
Ottoman Empire has yet to be written and the present study does not undertake
that task.15 Of course, the public sphere, both in its pre-modern and modern forms,
existed in the Ottoman Empire.16 However, it had a different background and was
affected by different factors from the European milieu.17 As a result of modern urban
development, the public sphere began to enter into its modern form. The modern
public sphere(s) in the empire was spurred by the development of peripheral capital-
ism and through the opening of urban spaces, in the form of public squares, gardens,
and wider roads. In addition, the process was accompanied by the proliferation of
cafe´s, associations, theaters, and scientific and literary societies, as a result of which
literary public spheres were formed in the empire. However, the main factor that led
to the proliferation of these public spheres in the empire during the nineteenth century
was the press in general and newspapers in particular.18 The official Ottoman press
began to be published in the nineteenth century and was followed by the emergence
of the private press. The transformation of the literary public spheres into political
public spheres in the modern sense took place throughout the century, reaching
its peak with the promulgation of the Ottoman constitution in 1876.19 In fact, the
creation of the private press and the proliferation of the ethnic press in the second
half of the nineteenth century further developed the notion of multiple public
spheres as opposed to the public sphere dominated by the Ottoman ruling elite.
In 1878, however, Sultan Abdu¨lhamid dissolved the Ottoman parliament and
derailed the constitution, putting an end to the political public sphere. Hence, the
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institutions that once served as the basis of the developing public sphere(s) were
derailed and weakened. He also established one of the most sophisticated spying
systems in the history of the Ottoman Empire. As a result, by the beginning of the
1880s, the ethnic groups’ journalist activities shifted West, from Lebanon, Syria, and
Anatolia to European cities and Egypt. Here, an exilic public sphere was established
in which exiles of different ethnic backgrounds expressed their political views,
discussed their projects for the empire, interacted with each other, and attempted
to mobilize their host governments by using various means of expression, from exilic
media to public gatherings and discussion.20
After the Young Turk Revolution of 1908, this exilic public sphere was trans-
formed into a homeland public sphere. The revolution allowed for an immediate
boom in the serial publications of different ethnic groups in the empire.21 In the two
years after the revolution, censorship was nonexistent. In the first year alone about
200 periodicals were published in Istanbul.22 Hence, the media that served the
development of multiple/competing public spheres prior to the Hamidian period
were reinstated during the post-revolutionary period. However, these contentious
and weak public sphere(s) that lacked strong institutional basis would become the
medium through which the existing tensions in the empire were going to surface,
demonstrating the incompetence of the local administration to deal with contentious
situations. The weak public sphere(s) became a medium through which both the
satisfied and the dissatisfied elements aired their content or discontent with the
new regime and deliberated the political future of the empire by using the tools of
modernity. In addition, the weak public sphere(s) also became an important vehicle
for the enactment of violence by the dissatisfied groups. Thus, the relationship
between public sphere and violence is crucial to understanding the massacres carried
out against the indigenous Armenian population. After the revolution, the growth in
Adana’s public sphere not only fomented political activism within formerly outlawed
groups, but it also contributed to an escalation of ethnic tensions. The physical and
verbal manifestations of Armenians in the public sphere in the forms of cultural and
political processions, the bearing and selling of arms in public,23 and theatrical pre-
sentations as well as the use of print media sent alarming vibes among the dissatis-
fied elements, which began to use the same medium to air their anxieties about
and discontent with the new created order. Thus, the public space in Adana would
become not only the place for the re-enactment of identities; it would also become
a vehicle through which the existing political, social, and economic anxieties would
be manifested in two waves of massacres which took place in conjuncture with the
counterrevolution.
Historiography and the Adana Massacres of 1909
The study of ethnic strife, violence, and repression in the Ottoman Empire in general
and in Anatolia in particular remains marginalized in the historiography of the
Ottoman Empire. Only a handful of scholars have attempted to put these subjects
at the core of their inquiries.24 However, most of these works concentrate on the
Armenian Genocide during World War I and do not consider the incidents of violence
prior to the war.25 Other scholars attempt to represent the acts of violence that took
place at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries as
part of a linear process that culminated in the extermination of the Armenians.26 A
major methodological deficiency of these works stems from the failure to appreciate
that violence during the early phase of the Second Constitutional Period was an
integral part of the revolutionary process. While some Turkish scholars deny the
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involvement of local government officials in the massacres by blaming the Armenians
who revolted as part of a conspiracy to establish a kingdom in Cilicia,27 some Armenian
scholars, whose work is overshadowed by the Armenian genocide, accuse the CUP of
acting behind the scenes to destroy the Armenian economic infrastructure in Adana
in order to curb any future political and economic development in the area.28
Development of Adana’s Public Sphere(s)
It is impossible to understand the development of Adana’s public sphere without
understanding the impact of the revolution on the Anatolian provinces and the
ways in which it led to the emergence of contentious public sphere(s). The Young
Turk Revolution caused major changes in the dynamics of power within the pro-
vinces, leading to an erosion of social and political stability. By disturbing a thinly
balanced power equilibrium, the revolution produced a great deal of dissatisfaction
within some segments of the population. The sudden mushrooming of Young Turk
cells and clubs in the provinces caused extreme anxiety among the notables and the
ulema (religious clerics) in the Anatolian provinces. Although the CUP had branches
in all Anatolian and Arab provinces, it was not in full control of the provinces. A
major factor in the deterioration of the intra-ethnic relationship among the Muslims
in Anatolia was the dismissal of local officials and their replacement with CUP
members or people loyal to the CUP. This contributed immensely to the rising
tension between the CUP and the people of the ancien re´gime, mainly because a
whole stratum of notables who had benefited from the ancien re´gime had lost power.
Hence, one cannot understand the changes in Adana after the 1908 revolution with-
out understanding the regional waves of discontent manifested after the revolution,
especially in the Anatolian provinces. What distinguished Adana from other pro-
vinces was its economic and agricultural centrality to Anatolia—which attracted
thousands of migrant workers arriving from Hadjin, Erzerum, Bayburt, and Bitlis—
and its complex ethnic composition, which was a main catalyst in the deterioration of
this ethnic relationship.29 Therefore, I argue that the conditions created after the
revolution and the emergence of contentious public sphere(s) prepared the ground
for a violent backlash.
Adana was also an important spiritual and economic center for Armenians in
Anatolia. It housed the Sea of the Catholicosate of Sis (Kozan).30 In addition, the
city had eight churches, two of which were Gregorian, one Protestant, and one
Catholic. There were also Greek, Syrian, and Chaldean churches.31 Armenians had
two schools, the Apkarian and the Ashkhenian schools, the French had the Jesuit
missionary school for boys and girls, and the Americans had the Girls College. In
Tarsus, Americans also had St. Paul’s Institute College.32
Prior to the massacres of 1909, Adana’s population consisted of 62,250 Muslims;
30,000 Armenians; 5,000 Greeks; 8,000 Chaldeans; 1,250 Assyrians; 500 Christian
Arabs; and 200 foreign subjects.33 The Muslim population of Adana included Turks,
Kurds, Fellahs, Circassians, Avshars, Cretans, and nomads. In addition, every spring
about 30,000–40,000 migratory workers would come to Adana from Aleppo, Harput,
Sivas, Diarbekir, Erzerum, Hajin, Bitlis, Bayburt, and Erzerum to work as farmers,
tilling, reaping, and cultivating the cotton fields, or to work in factories.34 The Muslim
migrant workers always exceeded the Armenian migrant workers by a ratio of 2:1.
Adana was also the center of the cotton trade on the Cilician Plain.35 David
Fraser who visited Adana prior to the 1908 revolution argued that at the end of the
nineteenth century it was customary for 60,000 laborers to visit Cilicia annually
for the purpose of assisting with the harvest. However, he argues that this annual
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migration had ceased at the beginning of the twentieth century because the resident
population aided by steam ploughs, steam threshers, and reaping machines was not
able to undertake the labor by itself. This point is extremely important because it
demonstrates the ways in which the introduction of modern agricultural and produc-
tion technologies have caused substantial dissatisfaction among the migrant workers
who used to benefit from the pre-modern agricultural mediums and has created what
Ayhan Aktar calls ‘‘accumulated envy’’ toward the Armenians.36 This ‘‘accumulated
envy’’ would reveal itself in violent backlash by the migrant workers against the
Armenians. In addition to this, Adana also housed several large establishments
involved with ginning, spinning, and weaving. Among these, the most important
factory was owned by the Greek Trypani Brothers who introduced the cotton indus-
try to Cilicia.37 In addition, the Deutsche Levant Cotton Company, which was
financed by German, Swiss, and Austrian financiers, was also active in the region.38
The Armenian population was very involved in trade and industry. They played a
predominant role in exporting materials from Adana.39 Armenian sources indicate
that Armenian prosperity in Adana was lamented by some Turkish notables, such
as Abdu¨lkadir Bag˘dadizade, one of the most influential notables in Adana.40
The Ottoman Public Sphere in Adana: The Climax of Contentious
Politics between the CUP and the Notables
As soon as the constitution was enacted, people in Adana and Mersin began rejoic-
ing. Masses were held in honor of the sultan and the Ottoman nation.41 However,
these festivities of the revolution were only euphoric feelings that did not reflect the
different social sectors’ actual attitudes toward the revolution. The revolution and
the reinstatement of the constitution in Adana led to the rise of new figures. Ihsan
Fikri, a self-acclaimed Young Turk, suddenly became a public figure. Fikri played
an important role in organizing festivities in honor of the revolution. At the end of
the festivities, Fikri sent a congratulatory telegram to the CUP branches in Manastir,
Salonica, and Istanbul on behalf of the people of Adana. The next day the CUP
Central Committee asked Fikri to establish a CUP branch in Adana.42 To counter
the CUP’s influence, Abdu¨lkadir Bag˘dadizade,43 one of the most influential notables
of Adana, formed a group called the Agricultural Club (Ziraˆat Kulu¨bu¨) composed of
Adana notables, people from Idlib, and softas.44 They were supported by another
anti-CUP committee, the Scientific Committee (Cemiyet-i I˙lmiye). As with the other
CUP branches in the provinces, people from the ancien re´gime entered the ranks
and the first task of the new CUP branch was to force the local vali (governor) to
resign.45 Bahri Pas¸a resigned and for some time the CUP branch administered
the province. It also succeeded at removing Kaˆzim Bey, the chief of police ( polise
mu¨du¨ru¨), and police superintendent (komiser) Zor Ali from their positions.46 In addi-
tion, the CUP began sending delegates, consisting of one Armenian and one Turk, to
villages to preach to the masses about the constitution. In order to better understand
the tension that arose between the CUP and the local notables, it is important to
give a brief historical background of Ihsan Fikri.
Ihsan Fikri, whose original name was Ahmed Tosun, had been an officer of the
Salonica Agriculture Department. He was later exiled to Diyarbekir and then to
Payas. After his exile to Payas, he represented himself as a liberal. Bahri Pas¸a, the
vali, interceded with the authorities on his behalf to end his exile.47 After returning
to Adana, he married the daughter of a local property owner by the name of Menan
Bey. Prior to the revolution, Fikri had been the principal of the Handicraft School
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(Sanayi Mektebi) but was fired by the vali, who replaced him with Gergerlizade Ali
Effendi. After the revolution and the establishment of the CUP branch in Adana under
his leadership, Fikri began to persecute his opponents, particularly Gergerlizade.48
As a result, two groups emerged in Adana, one supporting Fikri and another
supporting Gergerlizade.49 This tension can be best defined as CUP versus the
local notables. In this intra-ethnic struggle the press played an important role.
In the post-revolutionary period five newspapers were published in Adana: Seyhan,
Yas¸asın Ordu, I˙tidal, edited by Ihsan Fikri; Rehberi I˙tidal, owned by Ali Ilmi
Effendi; and C¸ukurova, a weekly newspaper published by Mahmud Jelaleddin. I˙tidal
and Rehberi I˙tidal were in constant conflict. The latter was also supported by
C¸ukurova. According to Terzian, Ihsan Fikri wrote erratically, praising the Armenians
one day and attacking them the next.
After Bahri Pas¸a resigned, he was replaced by Mirliva Ali Pas¸a, who generally
kowtowed to the CUP. When Cevad Bey was appointed vali, tensions began to escalate
dramatically. Ihsan Fikri, seeing Cevad Bey’s weakness, tried to manipulate him into
removing Gergerlizade from his position as the principal of the school. Gergerlizade,
however, gained the vali’s favor. In addition, Cevad Bey used to frequently visit the
Agricultural Club and the Scientific Committee.50 This angered Fikri, who began
openly attacking the vali in I˙tidal, even calling for his resignation, but to no avail.51
Furthermore, he claimed that government was nonexistent in Adana and that it
was people like Abdu¨lkadir Bag˘dadizade who were truly running the affairs of the
country. In this tensed atmosphere, Zor Ali, the former police commissary (komiser)
of Adana who had been dismissed by the CUP, arrived in Adana and declared him-
self a member of the Fedakaˆrini Millet, a branch of the Ittihadi Mouhamadi, and
called on people of the same mind to join him.52 In this atmosphere of intra-ethnic
tension, news of the counterrevolution reached Adana, further altering the power
balance within the provinces.
The Armenian Public Sphere: Testing the Limits of Freedom
The Armenian festivities and demonstrations in honor of the constitution on 24 July
1908 were especially striking. The public sphere created after the 1908 revolution
allowed Armenian political parties to be active in Adana. Armenian cultural revival
began. Poetry, odes, and dramas about the Armenian national past began to be
published and performed, causing anxiety among the local Muslim population. In
addition, Armenians, ‘‘intoxicated with the new wine of liberty, often gave offense
by wild talk or arrogant behavior.’’53 In an interview with an Armenian newspaper
after the massacres, missionary Christie positioned at Tarsus argued that there is no
proof that the Christians as a whole desired separation from the Ottoman people or
government. Granted, he argued that there were a very few foolish men (Armenians)
who by their boasting and threats exasperated the Turks. However, he adds that
‘‘their acts and words ought not to be taken as justifying in the slightest degree the
cruelties that make this recent massacre worse than any that have gone before it.’’54
Armenian activities in the post-revolutionary period entailed physical and verbal
manifestations in the public sphere causing much anxiety among the dissatisfied
elements. For example, I˙tidal, the main Young Turk organ in Adana edited by Ihsan
Fikri, reported that on Sunday 29 March 1909 a play was performed by Armenians
at the Casino of Ziya Pas¸a in Mersin.55 In the words of one contemporary Ottoman
official in Adana, ‘‘At that night Armenians had opened the first curtains of revolt’’
(I˙s¸te Ermeniler ilk isyan perdesini o gece ac¸mıs¸lardır).56 The play was entitled
Temurlane and the Destruction of Sivas.57 The local mutessarif (subgovernor), as
Genocide Studies and Prevention 6:2 August 2011
158
well as other officials, was invited to attend the play. At the beginning of the play,
Temurlane gives an order to exterminate all the Armenians. A fierce struggle takes
place between Temurlane and an Armenian king. The king, along with his servant
and his daughter, becomes Temurlane’s prisoner. The king, hands chained and wear-
ing a thorn crown, sits hopelessly in a cell allocated to him by Temurlane. Suddenly,
two spirits appear before the king telling him that he will reclaim his kingdom
through the unity of his nation. And when the king tells the spirits that all of
the Armenians have been massacred, the spirits answer as follows: ‘‘These are
enough, do not feel sorry, thanks to unity the day will come that you will restore
your monarchy [kralıg˘ın tasdik edecekler]. You are going to preserve your indepen-
dence, be restful, do not detach yourself from unity, once more in the future you
will regain your crown.’’ I˙tidal reported that when the curtain closed all of the
Armenians in the audience began shouting and applauding ‘‘Long live Armenia,’’
‘‘Long live Armenian kingdom,’’ ‘‘Long live Armenians.’’58
On another occasion, a performance of Hamlet by the Armenian students of St.
Paul’s College of Tarsus made government officials and the local mufti (Islamic
scholar) uneasy. Helen Davenport (Brown) Gibbons, who taught at the school,
described the play and her role in putting on the performance in detail in a letter
sent to her mother on 7 April 1909. Gibbons described that when things began to
go badly for Hamlet’s stepfather, people stopped fanning. The attending dignitaries
became uneasy, and hunched their shoulders. They kept their eyes glued to the
stage. She continued:
They are not familiar with our great William, and believe, no doubt, that we invented
the play as well as the actors’ costumes. Horror of horrors! We had forgotten what
they might read into the most realistic scene. An Armenian warning for Abdul
Hamid? The assassins mastered the struggling king. He lay there with his red hair
sticking out from his crown, and the muscles of his neck stiffened as he gasped for
breath while his throat was cut with a shiny white letter-opener.59
In addition to these, the relationship in Adana between Armenian ecclesiastic leader-
ship and the local government deteriorated after the 1908 revolution, particularly
after the removal of the vali Bahri Pas¸a who had a cordial relationship with the
Armenians and especially with Bishop Moushegh Seropian.60 Fearful of what might
happen, the Catholicos of Sis, Sahag, sent telegrams to Istanbul warning of im-
minent massacres in the area. The Ottoman-Turkish newspapers of Istanbul reacted
negatively to these telegrams, saying ‘‘we do not want to believe in the existence of
the threat of massacre.’’61 At the time, the prelate of Adana, Bishop Moushegh, was
on a mission to Istanbul. When he returned to Adana he found that letters from the
villages warning of imminent threats have accumulated. Bishop Moushegh also sent
a pastoral letter to the Armenians of Adana emphasizing the need for harmony
among the people.62 However, the uncertain situation and the rising tension led
Bishop Moushegh to encourage Armenians to buy arms63:
We advise the people, in order to be able to fulfill their duties towards the country
and constitution, every person should be armed more or less according to his ability.
That readiness should be at the same time somehow a means for self-defense, against
an unfortunate attack, until the constitutional government comes to their aid.64
Dr. Christie, the American missionary, criticized Bishop Moushegh’s words and
deeds and those of the young men who were following him. He argued that it was
wrong to bring tin boxes of arms and ammunition to Mersin addressed to Armenians
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in Adana.65 However, he explained that even these do not prove that there was an
intention to rebel against the government.66 Thus, Bishop Moushegh in the eyes
of the local Muslim population became an agitator and the source of tensions for
inciting the Armenians against the Turks and encouraging them to establish King-
dom Cilicia.67 As a result, twenty-five days before the massacres Bishop Moushegh
was banished from Adana to Cairo by orders from the vali.68
The Consolidation of Violence: The Breaking Point
In March 1909 ethnic tension began to deteriorate dramatically, as manifested in a
couple of sporadic attacks on Armenians.69 One of these attacks became the catalyst
precipitating the first wave of the Adana Massacres/Clashes. On 28 March 1909, an
Armenian named Hovhannes was attacked by a group of Turks, led by a man named
Isfendiar.70 During the ensuing fight, Hovhannes killed Isfendiar, wounded some of
the other attackers, and fled to the Armenian Quarter in Adana. From there he
escaped to Cyprus. Isfendiar’s funeral attracted not only those angered by the
killing, but also much of the element dissatisfied with the new order, the constitu-
tion, and its Armenian ‘‘collaborators.’’ The body was dragged through the streets
for exhibition and became a catalyst in the manifestation of the existing economic
and political anxieties. This immediately led to the mobilization of the masses and
prepared the ground for the enactment of violence.71 Inflammatory remarks were
made in the mosques and it was proclaimed that the Armenians of Adana had risen
and were ‘‘killing true believers and burning their houses.’’72 Isfendiar’s family de-
manded that the vali capture the murderer.73 A few days later, one of Hovhannes’s
other attackers died from the wounds he received, elevating the level of anger and
excitement among the Muslim population. As the situation intensified, the vali of
Adana telegrammed Istanbul warning of an imminent threat in Adana. Adil Bey,
on behalf of the Ministry of Internal Affairs responded, ‘‘The financial institutions
along with foreign buildings should be protected and peace should be preserved’’
(Mu¨essesaˆt-ı maˆliye ile emaˆkin-i ecnebıˆyenin muhaˆfazası ve iaˆde-i aˆsaˆyis¸e dikkat
olunması).74 Some Armenian sources understand this telegram as an order to
massacre the Armenians.75 This sentence, however, is too vague to necessarily be
understood in that way. With the arrival of news about the counterrevolution from
Istanbul, the situation exploded.
The First Waves of Massacres/Clashes (April 14, 15, and 16)
‘‘What could I do, if there is Constitution.
Whatever the majority wants they will do so’’76
In Adana, Tuesdays were market days. Peasants would travel from their villages
to Adana in the morning and return in the evening. On Tuesday, 13 April 1909,
these peasants did not return to their homes. It is also noteworthy that because of
seasonal migration, 30,000–40,000 additional Armenian, Kurdish, and Turkish farm
workers inhabited Adana.77 On April 14, the disturbances began. Armenians opened
their shops in the early morning, but soon saw groups of Turks, Kurds, Circassians,
Bas¸ıbozuks,78 Cretans, and Muslim refugees along with the seasonal workers carry-
ing hatchets, blunt instruments, axes, and swords in their hands and wearing white
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bandages (saruks) around their fezzes79 in various quarters of the city.80 This made
the Armenians extremely anxious, and they quickly closed their shops.81 When the
Muslims saw that Armenians were closing their shops early they too became anxious,
and a rumor spread that the Armenians were going to attack them. The mob, con-
sisting of Turks, Kurds, Fellahs, Circassians, Gypsies, and Cretan refugees along
with the migrant workers, began looting and attacking the center of the town.82 Zor
Ali, the police superintendent, rallied his troops and besieged the Armenian Quarter
of S¸abaniye. Meanwhile, Armenians took a defensive position in the Armenian Quarter
and fortified themselves in houses.83
The first day of the massacres/clashes saw sporadic and unorganized attacks. On
the first night, the mob began burning the Armenian Quarter.84 The attacks and the
clashes intensified the next day.85 The majority of the Armenian population found
shelter in Armenian churches and schools and some in foreign missions. By the third
day, the mob grew as Turks arrived from Aleppo and Sivas to take part in the
pillage. Since the Armenians were running short on ammunition, they asked the
government for protection.86 In response, the vali organized a reconciliation meeting
between Turkish and Armenian notables.87 By the fourth day the situation had
calmed. It is impossible to accurately assess the number of casualties. Hundreds of
wounded Armenians were taken to the Apkarian Armenian school which was turned
into a hospital. Many Armenians escaped to Mersin.88 The carnage, looting, and
killing lasted for three days (April 14, 15, and 16). Many Armenians were killed as
well as many Muslims, some of whom were killed while attacking the Armenian
Quarter. It seems that the first wave of massacres/clashes was minor compared
to the second wave that will be discussed next. Nevertheless, Armenian shops,
businesses, and institutions suffered immense damage.89
Public Sphere and the Transition from Verbal to Physical Violence
Most Armenian and European sources indicate that Ihsan Fikri, the leader of
the CUP in Adana, and his newspaper I˙tidal played an important role in inciting
the masses before the initiation of the second wave of massacres.90 However, these
sources do not tell us exactly what kind of discourse was being propagated by I˙tidal.
This raises important questions about the transition from violent political discourse
to physical violence. In cases of extreme escalation of ethnic tensions, during which
the existing political and civil institutions are unable to contain the lawlessness and
disorder of a region, the public sphere becomes the medium through which violence
manifests itself. Furthermore, it contributes to the precipitation of ethnic tensions
and accelerates the motives for the perpetration of violence against the vulnerable
group. In the case of Adana, instead of declaring a state of siege, the local govern-
ment chose to reconcile both parties who were involved in the violence by making
superficial statements about coexistence and harmony. The public sphere was not
restrained nor did the local government take the necessary steps to suppress pro-
vocative statements by reactionary groups. On the contrary, the printed form of com-
munication, one of the most important components of a public sphere, was used to
instigate the public against the vulnerable population. Hence, Ihsan Fikri was able
to verbally attack the Armenians, using extraordinarily violent language, and to
convince the masses that the Armenians had attempted a coup d’etat to establish
the Kingdom of Cilicia.91 According to the British vice consul in Adana, Doughty-
Wylie, every Turk in Adana was fully persuaded at the time that the Armenians
had set fire to their own houses with the idea of bringing about foreign intervention.
Stories about Armenian atrocities on Muslim men and women were also widely
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spread.92 According to Doughty-Wylie, the Turks put all of the blame on the Armenians
because they armed themselves and because certain delegates of the Hunchak Party,
and preachers like Bishop Moushegh, had urged the Armenians to openly fight the
Turks and set up a principality; the Turks also believed that they had fixed a day
on which to rise and rebel against the Turks.93 Although Doughty-Wylie believed
that the Hunchak Party was planning something, he nevertheless argued that they
represented a fraction of the people. On the contrary, he argued that such wide-
spread destruction could not have taken place without some ‘‘secret preparation on
the Turkish side,’’94 demonstrating the premeditated nature of the event.95
On 20 April 1909, thousands of free copies of I˙tidal were distributed in the
streets of Adana. In this issue, Fikri along with his colleagues Ismail Sefa96 and
Burhan Nuri vehemently attacked the Armenians.97 In an article entitled ‘‘An Awful
Uprising’’ (Mu¨dhis¸ bir Isyaˆn), Sefa stated that a wave of boiling rage and indepen-
dence was destroying the country.98 He argued that Armenians, like the Turks,
had been oppressed for thirty-three years by the despotic regime. Then they united
with the Turks and applauded their ‘‘holy revolution.’’ However, Sefa argued that
Armenians soon began preparing themselves for the ensuing uprising by stockpiling
weapons. According to Sefa, once the Armenians possessed weapons, their rhetoric
changed. The phenomenon of Armenian fedayees (fighters) with Mauser riffles roam-
ing the streets alarmed the Turks. According to Sefa, the first signs of agitation
occurred on Friday when two Muslim youths were killed in the S¸abaniye neighbor-
hood. He was referring to the murder of Isfendiar. Sefa argued that although the
vali had assured the Turkish population that he would capture the murderer, thus
restoring order, the Armenians refused to turn over the murderer. For Sefa this
was nothing less than an uprising (isyaˆn). Sefa concluded that when the Armenians,
‘‘after all this barbarism and crime,’’ saw the profusion of soldiers and people pour-
ing in from the villages and understood that they would not succeed, they stopped
their attacks.
In the same issue, an article by Burhan Nuri posed the rhetorical question ‘‘can
the Armenians establish a state?’’ Burhan answered that only the foolish would
believe that Armenians, numbering less than two million scattered throughout the
empire, could defeat the Ottoman Empire and be able to establish an independent
country.99 Burhan attacked the European powers in his article saying that any
European power cannot impose on the Ottoman Empire the establishment of an
Armenian state in Cilicia. Burhan concluded as follows:
If the Armenians intend to form a state, the land for that state should not be in the
Ottoman Empire, rather they should look for it in the poles, in the desert lands of
Africa and immigrate there. They cannot reach their goal scattered in Istanbul,
Adana, Aleppo, Diyarbekir, Bitlis, and Van.
In the section of I˙tidal on news from the provinces, an editorial lamented that Adana
would be ‘‘the victim of this horrible barbarism.’’ The editorial argued that while
the Turks were striving to live with the Armenians in happiness, the Armenians
caused a ‘‘huge calamity on the head of the country through the organization of an
agitation.’’100
Armenians, according to the editorial, had arrived in Adana from Marash,
Hadjin, Harput, Diyarbekir, and from the Armenian populated provinces of Anatolia.
The article argued that by forming a majority in the area, Armenians hoped to
create agitation and demand autonomy.101 They were encouraged in this by the
success of Austria-Hungary in annexing Bosnia and Herzegovina and by the de jure
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independence of Bulgaria from the Ottoman Empire on 5 October 1908. For this
purpose, they hoped to provoke the intervention of the European powers. The article
concluded by saying that ‘‘looking at the painful situation, there is no doubt that
they [the Armenians] were the reason of their own destruction, the Turks, and of
the country.’’102
The editorial board of I˙tidal provided its own version of the causes and reasons
for the deterioration of the ethnic relations and their culmination in the massacres.
Whether or not the claims made by I˙tidal were true, they were vital in shaping
public opinion in Adana, particularly the claims regarding an Armenian conspiracy.
These articles in I˙tidal fumed public opinion in Adana after the first wave of
massacres/clashes.
The Second Wave of the Massacres (April 25—27)
When Armenians heard the news that additional troops were going to come to Adana
from Mersin to help preserve order, they were elated.103 On April 25, 850 soldiers
from the second and the third regiments arrived from Dede Ag˘ac¸. After the regi-
ments set up a camp in Adana, shots were fired at their tents. A rumor immediately
spread that the Armenians had opened fire on the troops from a church tower in
town.104 The military commander of Adana, Mustafa Remzi Pas¸a, made no attempt
to validate these rumors, but nevertheless ordered his soldiers to strike back at the
Armenians. On Sunday, April 25 at 1:00 p.m. a battalion attacked the Armenian
school that housed the injured from the first wave of the massacres. Soldiers poured
kerosene on the school and set it on fire with people inside.105 Regular soldiers,
reserve soldiers, and mobs along with the Bas¸ıbozuks attacked the Armenian
Quarter. They burned down churches and schools. The conflagration in the city of
Adana continued until Tuesday morning, April 27, and destroyed the entire Arme-
nian residential quarter and most of the houses in the outlying districts inhabited
by Christians.106
Another factor which precipitated the massacres was the unwillingness of
Turkish troops to maintain order. Armenian sources indicate that weapons were dis-
tributed freely by the government to local civilians who took part in the massacres,
looting, and carnage. The second wave of the massacres was larger in scale and more
violent than the first. While the massacres in the city of Adana were taking place,
rumors spread throughout the province that Armenians had revolted in Adana,
killed all the Muslims, and were going to destroy the villages. This caused extreme
anxiety and provoked retaliatory attacks by the Muslims on Armenian villages.
Conclusion
More than 100 years have passed since the massacres of Adana and historians con-
tinue to debate what the main causes of the massacres were. Indeed, the revolution
should be regarded as the major catalyst in the deterioration of the situation. How-
ever, the massacres would not have taken place without the host of other factors
mentioned in this article. The violence inflicted on the indigenous Armenian popula-
tion should be understood as a manifestation of the anxieties caused by the major
change within the political framework brought by the revolution. The weak institu-
tions of the public sphere(s) in Adana played a dominant role in intensifying these
anxieties and causing much distress among the local population and the notables of
the ancien re´gime. This anxiety was not only political; rather it had serious economic
ramifications at a time when modern agricultural technologies had replaced the
old ones, causing much dissatisfaction among the poor migrant workers who were
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benefiting from pre-modern modes of production. Thus, the dominant role played by
the migrant population in the massacres could also be interpreted as an attack on
modernization, represented by drastic changes in the mediums of production.
The bloodshed that Mihrdat Noradoungian was so much worried about did mate-
rialize during the counterrevolution. What followed was two waves of clashes, massa-
cres, pillaging, and looting. The complicity of local government officials, such as the
vali Cevad Bey and the commander of the army Mustafa Remzi Pas¸a, is undeniable
as the Military Tribunals and the investigation commissions sent from Istanbul
attested.107 Worse yet was the role that one of the most important notables of
Adana, Abdu¨lkadir Bag˘dadizade, and his faction played in the massacres.108 The
CUP representative in Adana, Ihsan Fikri, along with Ismail Sefa, played a domi-
nant role in shaping public opinion and transforming verbal into physical violence.109
The reaction of the central government and the CUP against the real culprits of the
massacre was lenient, as the court martial’s decision attested.110 Most of the key
architects of the massacres mentioned above received light sentences. About fifty
Muslims (some of them innocent)111 and six Armenians were sentenced to death
and many were sentenced to imprisonment with hard labor.112 It seems that the
CUP, having just recovered from a huge blow as a result of the counterrevolution,
was afraid to take drastic action against the real culprits of the massacres because
it was afraid that this would have wider effects in the region and would endanger
its existence. The Adana massacres not only resulted in huge Armenian loss of
life, but also led to the destruction of one of the most important Armenian economic
centers in Anatolia.
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Did Newsnight Miss the Story? A Survey
of How the BBC’s ‘‘Flagship Political
Current Affairs Program’’ Reported
Genocide and War in Rwanda between
April and July 1994
Georgina Holmes
King’s College London
At the time of the genocide in Rwanda in 1994, the BBC’s late-night political dis-
cussion program Newsnight was one of the few media political spheres within
which representatives of the British government, opposition parties, the United
Nations, and international non-governmental organizations could comment on
British foreign policy. Since 1994 the British media have been charged with fail-
ing to report genocide; yet a focus on print media has created a void in under-
standing how BBC’s Newsnight covered events. The present article analyzes
Newsnight reporting between 6 April 1994 and 30 September 1994 and reveals
that the BBC framed the genocide in a specific way until 31 July 1994. A com-
parative reading between the discourse of presenters, guests, and the news reports
filed by journalists reveals that, despite a stack of media evidence that genocide
was taking place, no representatives of the British government or opposition
parties were interviewed on the role of the UK as a permanent member of the UN
Security Council and signatory of the UN Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide from April to the end of July. Rather, a
focus on the stateless ‘‘ international community’’ and the failings of UN bureau-
cracy, the timing of debates, and the presenters’ refusal to use the word ‘‘genocide’’
when guests and journalists did reveal that Newsnight failed to hold British
politicians to account.
Key words: Rwanda, genocide, BBC, British media, war, democracy,
British government
Introduction
In the years since the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, the British media have come under
considerable scrutiny for failing to distinguish between government and Rwandan
Patriotic Front fighting on the front line and the systematic killing that was taking
place well behind government lines. By framing the killings as ethnic conflict and
tribal civil war, the British media have been accused of contributing to the British
government’s disinterest in Rwanda and failure to meet its legal obligation as a
signatory of the UN Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (1948). This accusation has been challenged by numerous journalists who
seek to ensure that their version of events will go down in history.1 Former Africa
editor for The Independent Richard Dowden has contended that Rwanda itself has
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‘‘challenged assumptions and changed perspectives’’ about how the media should
report on political crises in Africa.2 Dowden was responding to an article published
in African Affairs by Linda Melvern and Paul Williams which argued that the
British press may also have contributed to ‘‘a wilful policy of indifference and
obstructionism by the British government.’’3
There have been several studies detailing press coverage on Rwanda and ques-
tioning the extent to which the British media missed the story during the three
months of genocide.4 A focus on the UK ‘‘CNN Effect’’ equivalent, which assumes
that media coverage can influence government foreign policy, overrides discussions
on the extent to which the British government dictated how the British media should
frame events. In both academic and journalistic spheres, discussions have been limited
in scope by an almost obsessive focus on broadsheet newspapers, at the cost of omit-
ting television news programs. This omission is deeply unsettling, not least because,
unlike printed texts which remain under tight editorial control, television news and
political discussion programs provide media spaces within which political discourse
is created and contested by multiple political actors simultaneously.
Perhaps more surprising is the absence of BBC’s Newsnight from the discussion.
Deemed an essential component of British democracy and renowned for its provision
of in-depth analyses of political events and for holding to account those people re-
sponsible for them,5 Newsnight in 1994 was one of a limited number of media public
spheres within which British politicians jostled to appear. Without the Internet and
multiple television channels, Newsnight provided an opportunity for British politi-
cians to promote themselves, their party politics, and their position on British
foreign policy. They are joined by a host of experts who together contribute to
Newsnight’s political discourse.
The absence of any extensive analysis of Newsnight has led me to assess how the
BBC current affairs program reported on the Rwandan Genocide between 6 April
and 30 September 1994. A cross-examination of news features provided by journalists
on the ground in Rwanda, media discourse generated by studio guests, and the
debates set by editor Peter Horrocks raises questions about whether Newsnight had
deliberately avoided using the word ‘‘genocide’’ and controlled studio debates in order
to protect the interests of the British government. The present article addresses two
aspects of reporting. The first part maps how and when political violence is referred
to as genocide to suggest that there existed a conflict between the images and
language in the news features sent by journalists in Rwanda and the spoken words
of the presenter (or news anchor) during the program. The second part examines
Newsnight’s political discourse and studio debates. Until now, there has been no
consideration of how political actors—including representatives of the UN, members
of governments, NGO workers, missionaries, military operators, and civilians—
maneuver to influence BBC narratives about war and genocide in the region. An
analysis of their political discourse, from which members of the British government
are distinctly absent, provides a new perspective on the way in which the news
anchors chose to frame events in Rwanda between April and July 1994.
A total of 29 Newsnight programs broadcast between 6 April 1994 and 30
September are analyzed. The corpus is based on a key-word search conducted by
staff at the BBC Archives to identify Newsnight programs that contained news
features on Rwanda during this period. These documentaries, in addition to all
programs broadcast in April 1994, were viewed and transcribed at the British Film
Institute (BFI) film archive in London in August 2007.
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Newsnight’s Institutional Framework
First aired on Wednesday, 30 January 1980 with presenter Peter Snow, BBC’s News-
night aimed to provide an in-depth analysis of the day’s news in a format that
brought together the genres of television news and current affairs, which until then
had been distinctly separate in British broadcasting. Founding editor George Carey
enforced one rule stipulating that Newsnight should not lead on the same story
as the BBC’s Nine O’clock News.6 Newsnight would also contribute to the BBC’s
requirement to provide impartial coverage of news and current affairs. Today, as
in 1994, Newsnight has a clear generic structure and has developed its own institu-
tional framework for organizing media political discourse.
The Newsnight presenter uses conventions typical of political interviews and has
a specific role to play in setting the agenda of the debate, questioning and challeng-
ing politicians, other representatives of the public, or lobbyists of governments and
international organizations. News anchors such as Peter Snow, Jeremy Paxman,
Sue Cameron, and Kirsty Wark, who all reported in 1994, adopt the generic identity
of the Newsnight presenter to appropriate specific discourse traits and a tough ques-
tioning style.7 In addition to the political debates, each Newsnight program includes
a series of extended news stories, often termed ‘‘news features’’ in the broadcasting
industry, by documentary filmmakers and distributors.8 Between ten and twenty
minutes in length, many of these short documentary films merge news and current
affairs and often provide some form of historical background or evidence which is
then debated in the studio.
The Newsnight formula and generic presenter persona have led some critics,
such as New Stateman’s Michael Leapman, to argue that the program’s style leans
too much toward ‘‘attack journalism’’ and focuses on creating rather than reporting,
or indeed, analyzing news.9 Advocates such as former Economics editor Will Hutton
believe that Newsnight, in enabling political discourse, provides ‘‘an essential aid
to living in a democracy’’; in 2002, he stated that the program was ‘‘one of half a
dozen . . . components now of actual British democracy and British citizenship.’’10
Former Director of Television Mark Thompson once described Newsnight as ‘‘the
single most important program on the BBC.’’11 The BBC boasts how over the years,
the program has ‘‘broken countless stories, produced ground-breaking and policy-
shifting films,’’ and ‘‘delivered many memorable interviews.’’12
Rwanda 1994
On 6 April 1994, the plane that was carrying the Rwandan President Juvenal
Habyarimana and President of Burundi Cyprien Ntariyamira back from Tanzania
was shot down by missiles above Kanombe airport in Kigali just after 8 p.m.13 The
presidents were returning from Arusha, where they had signed a UN peace agree-
ment as part of the Arusha Accords which aimed to establish power sharing between
the Hutu majority government and the Ugandan based, predominantly Tutsi-led
refugee movement, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). On the ground, the UN
Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) was led by Canadian Brigadier-General
Rome´o Dallaire who, under a Chapter Six mandate, was to oversee and monitor the
Broad Based Transitional Government (BBTG). Within an hour of the plane crash,
roadblocks were set up around the capital and mass killing on a scale that has
not been seen since the Nazi Holocaust began. In the first forty-eight hours Hutu
extremists, led by Colonel The´oneste Bagasora, undertook a military coup which
saw the deaths of Hutu Power’s political opposition, including the then interim
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Prime Minister and pro-democratic Agathe Uwilingiyimana and ten UN Belgian
soldiers who had been protecting her.14 According to the UN, from April 6 to the
end of July 1994, an estimated 800,000 people were killed, many within the first
two weeks of the shooting down of the plane. The genocide took place four years
into a war between the RPF and the former Mouvement Re´volutionnaire National
pour le De´veloppement (MRNDD) government.
In the regions where genocide was taking place, witnesses spoke of neighbors
killing neighbors but there was also a series of militias—Burundian Hutu refugees
and the Hutu extremist youth-wing, the Interahamwe—who travelled from district
to district killing and carrying out the most horrific human rights violations. During
this period, an estimated 250,000 women, many of whom were Tutsi or had family
members who were Tutsi, were raped. Civilian men and boys also suffered extreme
gender-based violence and were among the first group to be targeted for death. In
the first two weeks of genocide France, Belgium, and Italy sent troops into Rwanda
under a national remit to rescue their citizens, but they were not under UN com-
mand. On April 11 the Belgian peacekeepers began to pull out and by the end of
the first week of genocide and war, the US, France, and Belgium had closed their
embassies. On April 21, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 912—its first
since the beginning of the genocide—to withdraw the majority of peacekeepers and
retain a small contingency.
Throughout April, France cautioned the international community against an
intervention that would mean taking sides against the extremist Hutu government.
There was a reluctance to refer to the violence as genocide, with Britain and the US
being among the most vociferous in avoiding the term. On April 29, Czech Ambassador
Karel Kovanda, alongside Colin Keating, called for the UN to officially recognize
genocide in Rwanda.15 British Ambassador David Hannay claimed that if the UN
used the word genocide in official documents, the Security Council would become a
‘‘laughing stock.’’16 According to Melvern, British representatives, renowned for their
ability to frame ‘‘resolutions with mind-numbing ambiguity,’’ played a direct role in
crafting a statement taken from the Genocide Convention, objecting to ‘‘the killing of
members of an ethnic group with the intention of destroying such a group in whole
or in part,’’ arguing that such a crime, although not directly called genocide in the
statement, would be punishable under international law.17 By the beginning of
May, Sir David Hannay argued that the Organization of the African Unity (OAU),
which had put pressure on securing the peace agreement from 1990 onward, had a
‘‘key role to play’’ in halting the violence.18 It was not until May 13 that Secretary
General Boutros Boutros-Ghali suggested to the UN Security Council Dallaire’s
proposal to send in an additional 5,500 troops.19 There followed hours of discussion
behind closed doors before a public debate on May 17, whereupon it was agreed that
an additional force was required. Resolution 918 was passed, which recognized that
UN troops may be required to use force to protect civilians. No troops were made
available and both the UK and US believed that there should be a clear mandate
for military operations, but member states did not put forward the funds or military
personnel requested by the UN.20
Throughout May, Dallaire retained a voluntary force of some 350 men, despite
having been called to withdraw the troops early in April. From mid-May onward,
debates in the Security Council focused on the need to extend UNAMIR’s mandate
to military intervention. By June 17, as the MRNDD government and the extremists
were retreating westward into Zaire, France put forward a proposal to deploy French
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troops under a humanitarian mission Operation Turquoise. The Security Council
endorsed this proposal on June 22 in Resolution 929. The operation was met with
criticism by the British media and it was widely held that France was trying to
retain its francophone influence in the region.
Genocide or War? Newsnight’s Silenced Debate
‘‘Genocide’’ was first coined by Polish lawyer Raphael Lemkin to describe the politi-
cally sanctioned annihilation of targeted civilian groups outside of the context of war.
Under the United Nations Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide (1948) genocide constitutes the ‘‘intent to destroy, in whole or in
part, a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group.’’21 The Convention was estab-
lished out of recognition that the newly ratified Crimes against Humanity perceived
national sovereignty as sacrosanct. At the time, under international law, states and
individual perpetrators who acted within the boundaries of those states could still
freely commit genocide unless they did so across national borders.22 The UN stipu-
lates that nation states that have signed the Convention have a legal responsibility
to act to stop genocide and to hold perpetrators to account.
Since 1948 it has become apparent that the extent to which those UN member
states halt genocide rests more on political will than any acknowledgement of legal
responsibility. It is for this reason that using the word genocide in news stories and
political discussion programs that report on political violence is considered so impor-
tant. Accordingly, Newsnight, considered a central component of British democracy,
should at most challenge the British government and opposition parties to ensure
that the UK, as a signatory of the Convention, fulfills its role in preventing and halt-
ing genocide. However, an analysis of Newsnight programs broadcast between 6 April
1994 and 30 September 1994 reveals that the British government is not challenged
throughout the course of the genocide.
In the first days of the genocide, Newsnight’s coverage of political violence in
Rwanda is generated within the studio and completely controlled by the editor Peter
Horrocks. The first story is provided on the day after President Habyarimana’s plane
was shot down, Thursday, 7 April 1994, when the following is mentioned by pre-
senter Peter Snow in a single-sentence story during the summary of the day’s news:
‘‘eleven Belgian troops serving with the UN have been killed in fighting in the
central African Republic of Rwanda.’’23 The following day, Rwanda is mentioned in
the summary news by Kirsty Wark, who announces that the central African state
is ‘‘ in a state of anarchy tonight’’ and that ‘‘thousands of people have been killed
during two days of ethnic violence in the capital Kigali.’’24 In addition to using the
ethnic conflict/coming of anarchy framework of reporting, Wark refers to the history
of colonialism by honing in on the actions of the Belgian government who is ‘‘making
plans to fly its nationals out of the country,’’ although no effort is made to describe
the political history, which includes the genocides of 1959, 1963, and 1972.25 Visual
images portray both militarization and humanitarian catastrophe: we see soldiers
chanting and raising their guns in the air followed by pictures of refugee camps and
people—mainly women—huddled in makeshift temporary huts. According to my
research, in the first nine days of war and genocide, Rwanda received a total of 2
minutes and 50 seconds of coverage on Newsnight. Comprehensive reporting on the
country does not occur until almost a month after the genocide began when, on 4
May 1994, we are presented with the first news feature.
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Using the Word ‘‘Genocide’’
Overall, news features vacillate between describing political violence as ‘‘civil war,’’
‘‘ethnic war,’’ ‘‘ethnic cleansing,’’ and ‘‘genocide’’ in all its clarity. However, an
analysis of Newsnight programs reveals that the word genocide was only mentioned
five times between 6 April 1994 and 27 July 1994, before the RPF claimed victory
and declared a unilateral cease-fire. Newsnight presenters refer to the term just
three times and only after the US and UK recognize the new RPF government at
the end of July. Genocide is first mentioned by reporter Tom Carver in a news
feature broadcast on May 16: ‘‘Everyday, evidence of the genocide inside Rwanda
washes up at this outpost.’’26 His statement is not echoed by presenter Sue Cameron
who uses the ethnic conflict/coming of anarchy framework of reporting: ‘‘As the kill-
ings continue in Rwanda’s civil war, most of the dead are members of the minority
Tutsi killed by government supporting Hutus.’’27 The word genocide is not men-
tioned again until June 20 by expert Ian Lindon from the Catholic Institute for
International Relations in his second appearance on the show since the plane crash.
Lindon argues that French intervention to create a humanitarian zone in the west of
the country and a UN brokered cease-fire agreement will not stop the killing because
it is state-led political violence and a deliberate targeting of a particular civilian
group:
One of the sides – the Interim Government – has been guilty of genocide. The other
side, the Rwandan Patriotic Front, has done more than external agencies to free
people and to rescue their kith and kin. To consider a ceasefire at this point would
simply be to allow the killings to go on because it is not primarily regular armies
that are doing the killing, it’s the Hutu extremist mobs.28
Ignoring Lindon’s reference to genocide, Peter Snow continues the debate on whether
France should intervene in a pre-recorded (and therefore controlled) interview with
the General Secretary of the RPF, Dr. Theogine Rudasingwa, who refers to the
‘‘people responsible for genocide’’ three times.29 Rudasingwa talks about the ‘‘people
who definitely have carried out and planned the genocide’’ on July 4, the day when
the RPF took control of Kigali and declared it will establish a new government based
on the Arusha Accords, but again, this is not picked up on and debated by presenter
Sue Cameron.30 Later on, on July 15, Robin Denselow in his second news feature
for Newsnight since the genocide began, reports exclusively on the shooting war,
although his introduction makes it clear that genocide was taking place: ‘‘They’ve
captured the capital and now the rebel troops of the RPF are poised for the final
battle for Rwanda. It’s been an extraordinary victory, but can they really bring peace
to a country divided and wrecked by genocide.’’31 Denselow is practically ignored by
Paxman in the studio, who relies once more on the ethnic conflict/coming of anarchy
framework of reporting to emphasize the importance of a cease-fire.
It is not until 27 July 1994, when both the US and UK officially recognize the
new RPF government, that the word genocide is mentioned by a presenter when
Kirsty Wark hosts a Newsnight Special debate on Rwanda. Although this is the first
time a news anchor utters the word, Wark continues to use the ethnic conflict/
coming of anarchy framework of reporting, thus suggesting that the targeting of
civilians was degenerative in a backward, ‘‘African’’ kind of way. One month later,
on August 25, Kirsty Wark, echoing Martin Shaw’s concept of degenerative war,
declares somewhat inaccurately that ‘‘civil war turned into genocide.’’32 Newsnight
only begins to use the word genocide continuously from 22 September 1994 onward,
in sync with the UN. During this September broadcast, Jeremy Paxman introduces
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the headline story in a manner which criticizes the UN, even though Newsnight (and
the BBC) played no role in pressuring the UN into acknowledging that genocide was
occurring from April onward. Paxman declares, ‘‘A United Nations investigation has
at last given slaughter in Rwanda the name it so long seemed to merit: it was geno-
cide.’’33 This statement is qualified by Robin Denselow’s news feature wherein he
reports that the ‘‘UN is under attack in Africa for taking so long in bringing those
responsible for genocide to justice.’’34 In the first three months of reporting since
the plane crash, journalists in the field and guests on the show refer to genocide,
while Newsnight presenters avoid using the word.
Describing the ‘‘Act of Genocide’’
Agence France Presse (AFP) reporter Anne Chaon has argued that journalists are
obsessively preoccupied with their failure to properly describe political violence in
Rwanda following the shooting down of President Habyarimana’s plane. ‘‘Most
journalists,’’ she writes, ‘‘are not expert in genocide. Many of them, myself included,
arrived in Rwanda with very little knowledge of the country.’’35 As a consequence,
war was described more often than genocide. The problem of describing political
violence in Rwanda is expanded upon by BBC correspondent Mark Doyle, who spent
a significant amount of time in the first three months after the plane crash filing
stories from Rwanda. Doyle claims to have reported two types of conflict: the ‘‘shoot-
ing war’’ and the ‘‘genocide war,’’ but observes that he did not use the actual word
genocide until April 29 in a report which referred to British aid agency Oxfam’s
announcement that genocide was taking place.36 Doyle has since admitted that in
the first weeks he got the story ‘‘terribly wrong,’’ in spite of having been briefed on
the political situation in Rwanda by the ambassador of the African Embassy in
Kigali in early 1994.37
Like Chaon, journalists who were reporting in Rwanda alongside Tom Carver at
the beginning of May have expressed their difficulty in knowing how to recognize
genocide as something distinguishable from war. Australian Broadcasting Corpora-
tion (ABC) British journalist James Schofield, who met the BBC Newsnight team
outside the gates of the interim government’s temporary headquarters in Giterama
(its members having fled Kigali the month before), felt that his own coverage was
flawed. Schofield had missed the start of the genocide, had not been engaged, and
later found it difficult to gain entry into Rwanda. When he did travel into the inte-
rior from Burundi’s capital, Bujumbura, Schofield kept hearing stories of widespread
massacres but could not see any bodies, in part because the perpetrators had con-
cealed them. Schofield felt that it was challenging for journalists on the ground to
comprehend what was taking place, claiming that ‘‘you do have this blind spot about
genocide – it’s jolly difficult to imagine it.’’38
Other journalists who reported in Rwanda at the time felt, retrospectively, that
the difference between genocide and war was distinct. Geoff Adams Spink was a pro-
ducer for the BBC Radio Four Today Programme in May 1994. Having some interest
in Burundi, Spink approached his editor Roger Mosey for permission to travel to
Rwanda from the UK. His editor agreed, provided that he report only from the
borders of neighboring countries and not enter into the interior. Spink notes that
his brief was to report on the refugees and the tensions because they had similar
ethnic tensions in Burundi.39 While in Tanzania, Spink was reliant on conversations
with NGO workers for information but they were only providing stories about what
Spink terms ‘‘the human migration fall-out.’’40 Upon spending four days in Burundi,
Spink, broadcaster Andy Kershaw, and another journalist secured an accompanied
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journey into Rwanda with an RPF guide. During his three-day trip, Spink indicates
that while in Rwanda he saw both war and genocide, but confusion lay in under-
standing what atrocities were taking place in the war zone and what was taking
place behind government lines (i.e., in the areas where genocide was continuing):
We saw both . . . front lines are not demarcated nicely with white picket fences . . .
they are very fluid places. I think we’d happened upon the frontline when even the
[RPF] officer who was escorting us believed that we were well behind it. But the dis-
tinction to me is that . . . five minutes before the landmines and the ambushes started
to happen, we stood on the bridge of the river with a detachment of RPF troops and
they pointed down and literally once every thirty seconds – and we timed it – literally
once every thirty seconds there was another body floating down the river and it
was usually civilian. No. it was exclusively civilian. Usually older people, children,
women – hands tied behind their backs, floating with their face down. Now that’s
not war, that’s genocide as far as I’m concerned. In the same way that the trashed
village had the bodies of all the villagers stuffed down the village well. And again,
that’s not war, that’s genocide. It’s the same with what we saw in Nyamata, so that
was genocide. And then we happened upon war as well.41
Concerned that Newsnight was too dependent on rehashing the pieces that BBC
news was delivering, producer David Belton sought an agreement from Peter
Horrocks to report on Rwanda in late April 1994. Like Spink, Belton’s brief was to
cover the refugee crisis that was building up in Tanzania and he was told to stay
outside of Rwanda’s borders. Alongside a sound technician and cameraman, Belton
arrived in Kenya on April 25 and travelled by car from Nairobi to Boneo camp
in Tanzania with BBC World Service correspondent Tom Carver, who had recently
reported from Johannesburg. The Newsnight team shot its first news feature on
those borders, where they encountered the RPF at Rusumo Falls before returning to
Nairobi to cut the film. Like Spink, Belton knew that they were witnessing genocide
but concedes that the first film was not explicit enough:
It wasn’t that we didn’t think it was genocide – we couldn’t say with certainty stand-
ing on the border. It was a difficult position to be in. It was complex in terms of what
we were seeing and what we were hearing. If we had been standing on a live wire to
Paxman and were asked were we seeing genocide, we couldn’t say yes. [In that first
film] there should have been a line saying this is what people inside the country are
saying. We made amends in the second one – no one else had been to or seen
Kabgayi.42
In another parallel with Spink, the team rebelled against the instructions of
Newsnight management and travelled into Rwanda from Bujumbura. A priest from
the former Yugoslavia, Vjeko Curic, was running an ad hoc aid mission into the
country. Curic would not let them ride in his lorry, and agreed instead that they
could tailgate him to Kabgayi, located well behind the extremist government lines
and known to the Red Cross as a place where systematic killing was taking place.
Belton believed that they saw genocide but at the time found it challenging to depict
on camera:
Yes, I believed we were witnessing genocide. It was complex – you saw it in various
ways but not on camera – that was switched off. We knew it was genocide as there
were people lying on the side of the street in large numbers. Some were butchered in
front of us and we saw the process happen. There was one man with pink identifica-
tion papers – we saw them. It was very difficult to tell people this or visualise it for
people – we didn’t do a good job in conveying what we’d witnessed. The camp was
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more complex because they [the Tutsi] were alive. Soldiers were walking in and out.
There was a Red Cross presence and therefore it was very difficult for the Hutu
soldiers to wipe out this particular group of people. The Bishop was high up in the
political hierarchy of the country but at the same time he was a bishop. The killing
was not something the government wanted to see themselves and at the time they
were under heat from the international community. The camp was just off the main
road, it was one month after the genocide had begun and they were several leagues
behind the front line – it was difficult for the government to call it civil war, which
is what they were saying. . . . The people in the camp were slowly starving to death
and were being pulled out. A lot of young women I think lost their lives. It felt like a
death camp in a Bosnian war – only more brutal.43
Journalists in the field and distributors of news features were aware that the story
was big. Ron McCullagh, director of the documentary film production company
Insight News TV based in London, distributed for journalists Catharine Bond, Nick
Hughes, and Lindsey Hilsum during the genocide. It was in his company’s interests
to rally broadcast new editors into purchasing footage. Insight News TV had hours of
rushes provided by Catharine Bond but no polished documentaries. From April to
June 1994, Insight News TV distributed footage to Germany, Spain, and Canada,
among others. But there was little interest in the UK. McCullagh recalls,
We faxed people around the world and we said this was happening, could you possibly
send us your interest and we’ll send you some material. Part of the problem was that
the material was unprocessed. Normally this is a company that produces and makes
films ourselves and so normally they get a finished piece. In this particular case, we
couldn’t do that because Catharine was on the road and filming all the time and what
finished pieces she was doing, she was doing directly for Channel 4.44
For McCullagh, there was a sense that the editors had already decided not to run
the story. Although he admits that his team did not explicitly use the word genocide,
Insight News was stressing that the level of violence was extreme and more than a
typical African civil war scenario:
This company has a reputation for dealing with stories around the world and there-
fore not the stories that are high up on the agenda, and we are careful about the
people we work with in order to protect that reputation. So there is never a question
of the veracity of our material. It’s down to whether it’s important enough to get on
the news bulletin from where the editor stands. . . . We tell them the story, they don’t
respond. Then we come back and tell them look, it really is a story. They still don’t
respond. Then we go back and say look this is really serious. At which point, they
close down. And they think ‘‘well you’re pestering.’’ They’ve already made their
decision.45
Describing Genocide
If media institutions are expected to monitor political violence and assess whether
genocide is in process, the question might focus on what evidence should be mediatized.
Genocide scholar Helen Fein’s paradigm is apt for assessing the extent to which evi-
dence of genocide was present in Newsnight news features. Fein identifies five con-
ditions which constitute genocide: evidence of a sustained attack on a selected group;
evidence that the perpetrator is part of an organized group, often led by a com-
mander; evidence that victims are targeted because they are members of a certain
collectivity as defined by the perpetrators; evidence that victims are defenceless;
and, finally, evidence that an intent to kill is sanctioned by the authorities.46 As
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Belton suggests, within Newsnight news features there is evidence of all of these
conditions in Rwanda, most notably in the documentaries shot in early May 1994.
For example, in the news feature broadcast on May 16, Carver interviews Vjeko
Curic, who reports, ‘‘The Tutsi I’ve met so far, those left behind, are just waiting to
be killed. . . . They don’t know how to get out of the situation, and most of them think
they will be killed. They are just waiting to die.’’47
In the same news feature, Carver observes that the authorities are both condon-
ing and instigating the targeting of civilians. Here, it is worth quoting the documen-
tary at length, since it demonstrates a logic of reporting based on the distinction
between war and genocide:
Most ordinary people are struggling to continue their lives amidst the carnage. But
they’re being bombarded by extremist propaganda on the radio, urging them to keep
killing their Tutsi neighbours and every so often we would get a glimpse of the horror
that lay beneath the surface. Yesterday, as we were waiting at this spot to be led
into the Seminary [the camp at Kabgayi], we watched a man being interrogated by
soldiers. With his hands tied behind his back, he knelt in the dirt pleading his
innocence. Suddenly, the soldiers handed him over to a group of civilians who clearly
wanted to kill him. . . . All this took place in sight of the Bishop’s palace. This is a
country where all moral order seems to have been destroyed.
The UN may be trying to stop the war between the government and the rebels but
that’s not where most of the atrocities are occurring. They are taking place in remote
villages deep inside the government controlled areas, far away from front lines and
foreign eyes.48
The challenge in describing genocide is also evident in their news features. On May
10, Carver states, ‘‘You cannot explain this as just a tribal conflict. At an ordinary
human level, Hutus and Tutsis have lived easily together, so much so that it’s hard
to distinguish one from another.’’49 Instead, the Newsnight team borrows from docu-
mentary film representations of the Nazi Holocaust to reproduce visual representa-
tions of genocide that would have been familiar to a British audience at the time.
Carver uses the language of the Holocaust to describe the death camp—labelled a
refugee camp—wherein Tutsi are selected to be taken away and killed by Interahamwe
and government soldiers. ‘‘These people are caught in a terrible dilemma,’’ Carver
says, ‘‘it felt as though we’d entered the Jewish ghettos at the height of Nazism.’’50
Here, camera shots echo the scenes of the Nazi concentration camps, first honing in
on people in the background, then focusing on a baby crying and a frail old woman
resting her head against the wall, before readjusting the focus of the camera on to
the wire fence in the foreground. The documentary then cuts to a hand resting on
the wire, before the scene pans out to see more children standing behind the wire.
Witnesses provide the most graphic accounts, but it is clear that they are unable
to adequately describe in words what they saw. Missionary Rob Wilson, interviewed
by Tom Carver for the May 10 news feature, recalls,
As a Christian, I can’t understand how a normal person would take up a panga
(machete) and er . . . just kill an innocent baby or a child or a mother. . . . And so some-
thing snapped inside these youths or whoever did the killing . . . that made them
do things that were unthinkable. It’s just not normal. I mean, you can understand
in a war situation, soldiers shooting each other but innocent people that had no
political affiliation – they were just children and so on . . . you just can’t . . . I just
can’t imagine . . . something gripped the people who were committing these massacres
and it’s difficult to explain it in human terms.’’51
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It is also clear that members of the Tutsi population are being singled out. On May
16, Tom Carver interviews Swiss businessman Claude Sonier, who was trapped in
Butare with his Rwandan wife and children before being rescued by an Italian
consort and is now in Burundi. It is quite clear that Sonier is deeply traumatized
by what he has seen, and Carver weaves his words into a narrative that sensational-
izes the horror of the journey into Rwanda on which they have only just begun to
embark:
Tom Carver: He told us that hundreds of people, including his wife’s mother,
had been thrown alive into a pit full of burning tires.
Claude Sonier: Forty percent of the population is dead today. Forty percent!
Because you have not so much Tutsi in life today.
Tom Carver: You talked about a big pit. Can you just describe this please?
Claude Sonier: No! No, it’s too much [shaking his head] . . .
Tom Carver: As he was leaving he gave a chilling warning of what lay ahead.
Claude Sonier: Sa me`re, son frere sont capite´. Un vieux – coupe´ en quarters.52
While at Kabgayi, unarmed civilian Rwandan Tutsi boys who are interviewed by the
Newsnight team also find it difficult to explain the horror they face:
Tutsi boys [translated]: They are attacking us. It’s unbelievable. They come in here
and take the old and the young out of the camp and kill them using knifes and
machetes. It defies imagination and there’s nothing we can do. . . . All the people they
target are Tutsi. They don’t want us to live in this country any more.53
Fein indicates that this inability to describe genocide is common among first-hand
witnesses and was just as notable during the 1915 Armenian Genocide when reports
by foreign correspondents, missionaries, travellers, and diplomats were sent from
Turkey to London and America. Fein notes that these observers knew that horrors
and crimes were taking place, and ‘‘words such as ‘atrocities,’ ‘extinction,’ ‘extermina-
tion,’ and ‘perished’ were reiterated,’’ but nothing with as much as the legal term or
concept of genocide.54 In the case of Newsnight reporting, ‘‘horror’’ becomes the most
frequently used word by both journalists and witnesses to describe what they saw. If
journalists, witnesses, and those about to be killed cannot find a word suitable for
the crime, we are left wondering who in media institutions is responsible for identi-
fying genocide amid such a stack of media evidence.
Studio Debates
Since Newsnight prides itself on its ability to challenge politicians on behalf of
British citizens one might ask, what was the political discussion program’s approach
to engaging representatives of the British government, a permanent member of the
UN Security Council, in studio debates when its very own news features provided
evidence of genocide in Rwanda? In this regard, how were studio debates framed to
allow for taking those in power to task?
On May 4, Rwanda is described in sensationalized terms by presenter Sue
Cameron who states that the ‘‘horror worsens’’ before questioning ‘‘what the UN
should do in Rwanda. Can intervention stop the bloodshed?’’55 This first debate sets
the scene for many repeat discussions between May and July 1994 about whether or
not the UN (but not UN member states) should intervene in Rwanda. Each time, the
angle of the story changes slightly but the issue on the agenda remains the same. On
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10 May 1994 Newsnight questions the role of US intervention in Rwanda, with pre-
senter Peter Snow describing two situations: civil war and humanitarian crisis
(refugees are fleeing), and the West having problems delivering aid to them.56 Civil
war dominates the next debate on May 16, the same day that the UN votes to send
5,500 troops to Rwanda and Carver’s accompanying news feature portrays images
similar to those of the Nazi Holocaust. The following day, concern is expressed for
‘‘world failure’’ in stopping war generally, and the ‘‘tragedy of Rwanda’’ as the
‘‘most recent’’ war becomes the case study in which to frame a discussion led by
Jeremy Paxman on the role of the US in ‘‘gearing [UN] member states into action,’’
although member states are not singled out.57 Six days later, on May 23, Newsnight
reports on the UN’s failure to ‘‘broker a ceasefire’’ and asks ‘‘what should [the then
Assistant Secretary-General in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations] Iqbal
Riza do next?’’ placing emphasis on UN bureaucracy and the role of international
civil servants.58
On June 20, the issue on the agenda concerns France’s decision to send in its
own troops on the humanitarian mission Operation Turquoise, and Newsnight asks
‘‘should France go in.’’59 On July 4, Newsnight reports the victory of the RPF, stating
that ‘‘the victorious Rwandan Patriotic Front find their advances blocked by France’’
before questioning ‘‘are French motives purely humanitarian and will it come to
open battle between French and Rwandans?’’60 Eight days later, on July 15, News-
night continues to report on the civil war, heralding that a cease-fire is ‘‘imminent’’
before discussing the exodus of refugees fleeing into Tanzania. It is not made clear
that these refugees are Hutu, some of them perpetrators, fleeing the advances of
the Rwandan Patriotic Front. Attention returns to the role of the world in saving
refugees from the ‘‘latest horror’’ on July 18 and 22, when again Rwanda serves as
a case study for discussing whether the West ‘‘really know[s] best’’ when dealing
with humanitarian crises.61
All of these debates are confined to the realm of international politics and inter-
national organizations (in particular the UN), which are imaged as detached from
domestic UK politics and British government foreign policy. Newsnight avoids dis-
cussing the British role in influencing UN decisions around military intervention.
Not once throughout the course of reporting on Rwanda does Newsnight refer to the
lobbying efforts of the political activists and NGOs that urged the UK government
to recognize that genocide was taking place. In late April, when Rwanda is absent
from Newsnight’s agenda, Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and Oxfam
publicly demanded that the British government take immediate action in the
interests of Rwandan civilians.62 On Tuesday, May 3 David Bryer, the director of
Oxfam, and British actress Helen Mirren presented a petition and accompanying
letter to the then Prime Minister John Major at 10 Downing Street stating that
genocide was taking place.63 On the following day, May 4, Oxfam printed an advert
in The Times, labelling the violence in Rwanda genocide—but arguing that genocide
was something extreme, greater than war—and the deliberate targeting of civilians.
Below the image of piles of skulls the caption reads,
After Cambodia the world said: ‘‘Never again,’’ yet in Rwanda there is genocide.
Oxfam does not use the word genocide lightly, but there is no other way to describe
the mass slaughter happening right now. Men, women and children are being sys-
tematically hunted down, tortured and killed. The rivers are choked with bodies. . . .
Half a million people, mainly Tutsis, face imminent death.64
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Oxfam appeals directly to the British government: ‘‘What is happening in Rwanda is
a crime. The apathy of the world is criminal. We believe Britain must use its seat on
the Security Council to call for effective UN intervention in Rwanda, now.’’65 This
political activism is not included in Newsnight’s analysis of the day’s news. Instead,
on the day that Oxfam prints the advert, Newsnight begins its two-month-long series
of debates on the role of the international community, the need for a world leader in
gearing nation states into action, and criticism over the ineffectiveness of the UN.
From the start of the genocide until the end of July when the RPF took control of
the country, no British MP from any of the parties and not a single member of the
British government is interviewed by Newsnight, in spite of the importance of the
program in 1994, at a time when there were less media public spheres and less
opportunities for political actors to promote themselves and their parties. Interest-
ingly, the first MP to speak on Newsnight is interviewed on July 22 during News-
night’s declaration that America has ‘‘seized the initiative . . . to counter the crippling
epidemic’’ in Goma refugee camps in Zaire. Long-standing Conservative MP Toby
Jessel chooses to hone in on the humanitarian refugee crisis to commend both the
US and UK for funding aid agencies and the UNHCR (United Nations High Commis-
sioner for Refugees): ‘‘If every country had responded as well as the Americans and
the British,’’ he states, ‘‘the problem wouldn’t be as grave as it is.’’66
Once the RPF declared victory on July 22 and was recognized by the US as a
legitimate government, representatives of the British government began to appear
more frequently on Newsnight. However, an analysis of the Newsnight Special broad-
cast on 29 July 1994 and a close examination of the political discourse generated by
numerous actors during the studio debate suggest that Newsnight reporting ensured,
above all, that the interests of the British government were protected.
In the hour-long extended program, Kirsty Wark hosts a chat-show style debate
to examine the ‘‘developing crisis in Rwanda.’’ Baronness Lynda Chalker, the then
Minister of State for Overseas Development at the British Foreign Office, is the
special guest in the studio. She is joined by Rwandan Tutsi Joseph Mutabobo and
Rwandan Hutu Ally Yusuf Mugenzi, Rakiya Omaar of Africa Rights, former British
Gulf Commander General Sir Peter de la Billie´re, former director of War on Want
George Galloway, war crimes expert Dr. John Pritchard, Stuart Wallis of Oxfam,
Ali McHums of the Tanzanian High Commission, BBC World Affairs editor John
Simpson, Conservative MP Nick Budgeon, and Great Lakes scholar Filip Reyntjens.
US Special Envoy to Rwanda Brian Attwood, Archbishop Desmond Tutu, the UN’s
Iqbal Riza, the UNHCR’s Sylvanna Foa, Dominique Moisi from the French Institute
of Foreign Affairs, and RPF representative Dr. Rudasingwa—many of whom had
already appeared on Newsnight over the course of April, May, and June—appear on
the show via satellite link-up. The program includes a news feature by reporter
Robin Denselow in Goma and a ‘‘personal argument’’ by John Simpson. A series of
debates construct an overall story of events from, as Kirsty Wark describes in her
introduction, ‘‘the roots of the killings, the international response and its failures,
what the UN can deliver and the agendas which govern the West’s dealings with
post-colonial Africa.’’67 The role of individual nation states is barely discussed and
Britain is imaged as trying to prevent crisis in Rwanda from April onward.
Wark does well to avoid challenging Chalker about the role of the UK as a
permanent member of the UN Security Council. However, Chalker, introduced as
having just returned from Rwanda (and therefore appearing to be heavily involved
in the crisis), claims that ‘‘Britain has been helping in Rwanda since the beginning
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of April’’ before suggesting that the UK is itself powerless because other factors
prevent an international response. Chalker states,
We’ve already spent over £50m in this crisis. We have a large number of soldiers, we
all know in other places, but we have said we would help in the way that General
Dallaire has requested of us and we’ve fitted exactly what he needs. We were not
able to do so in May but it was generally agreed in the OAU that African forces would
go in. There has been a real difficulty I think in procurement, not only of forces, but
equipment, to allow them to be deployed. And that is something that the UN has
really got to put right.68
Wark then turns to Rakiya Omaar and asks whether the UN’s role, as Chalker
says, has been good enough. Omaar refers directly to the UN as having ‘‘completely
betrayed the hopes of the Rwandan people.’’69 Emphasis on the role of a seemingly
independent United Nations, existing outside the control or influence of member
states, is challenged first by Andrew Wallis from Oxfam, who makes the point that
General Dallaire and his small number of forces ‘‘have done their best’’ but have
been let down by the international community who ‘‘did not do enough to get 5,500
troops in.’’70 Wark turns to Archbishop Desmond Tutu to qualify that it was not just
a ‘‘Western failure’’ to act, thus detracting from a potential focus on the role of the
British government in providing troops. The Archbishop is the first person on the
program to refer to the ‘‘Rwanda crisis’’ as genocide, claiming that ‘‘governments
could have responded much earlier . . . to stop the genocide.’’71 This statement pro-
vides a platform for the then Assistant Secretary-General in the Department of
Peacekeeping Operations, Iqbal Riza, to cleverly expose the inaction of the member
states, in particular the UK:
Well I think Arch Bishop Tutu has already spoken for us [i.e. for the UN]. Indeed
there were troops on the ground, as Baroness Chalker says, but with all due respect
to her, those were troops that did not belong to the United Nations and the countries
who had contributed them immediately decided to withdraw them. Within a matter of
a couple of weeks, we were down from 2,500 to 250 because governments decided to
withdraw them and because the Security Council itself decided to reduce the force.
There was a certain reason. The governments who had sent those troops had sent
them for a certain mandate, which was to help the parties to implement the agree-
ment, which then broke down. They were not willing to leave these troops in the con-
dition when these massacres and the civil war resumed. One has to say that the very
fresh experience of Somalia was hovering in the background—the ghost of Somalia,
and that I suppose influenced governments. But as Arch Bishop Tutu has said, the
capacity, the potential, was there. It was not simply an African operation. The west
is very much a part of the United Nations and it has demonstrated that when the
will exists, they can deploy. The French deployed in a matter of days. The Americans
have deployed in a matter of days. And Baroness Chalker is right. The British have
offered a unit just during the last few days, and it will be there in the next few days.72
In closely analyzing the dynamics between Baroness Chalker, Brian Attwood, and
Iqbal Riza, we perhaps have some insight into the tensions between member states
and UN bureaucracy. Riza’s comment on the situation is quickly derided by US
Ambassador Attwood, who himself uses a number of tactics to divert attention away
from individual member states. First, Attwood contends that debates around the
responsibility of individual governments are ‘‘not particularly constructive,’’ since
‘‘ if we blame the United Nations, we’re blaming ourselves.’’73 In seemingly speaking
on behalf of the public, Attwood’s use of rhetoric moves the audience away from
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thinking about the crisis in terms of genocide and toward viewing it as chaotic ethnic
war and he cleverly distinguishes between ‘‘irrational’’ African politics and ‘‘rational’’
Western politics. At the same time, Attwood argues that we (that is, we in the ‘‘West’’)
must distance ourselves from what has already happened so that the entire world
can examine the crisis. It seems that Attwood subtly calls for the kind of distance
that only the passing of time can bring, thereby arguing that what has happened
has happened and there is nothing we can do now. Here, it is worth quoting his dis-
course in full:
I don’t think this debate is particularly constructive, frankly, I think we have a serious
problem in dealing with these kinds of conflagrations. The world itself must examine
this situation as a case study. It’s a very emotional situation because so many people
have lost their lives. But we should be realistic here. What has happened is that we
were faced with the need to place troops in the midst of a hot civil war. It’s very rare
that you will find the political will to do that. It seems to me we need to look—not
blame—the United Nations. Indeed, it is true we are all part of that. If we blame
the United Nations, we’re blaming ourselves. We have to look at our capacity to
respond to these things. It’s a much more constructive debate it seems to me, if we
can examine whether or not there was a way to prevent this crisis from happening in
the first place. These irrational forces at play. We’re now looking back with 20/20
hindsight and expecting to come up with rational answers. It’s easy to do in hind-
sight, as opposed to on the spot.74
Later, Attwood uses similar tactics to distance the US from the responsibility of
making political decisions about whether to intervene (to stop genocide), announcing
that, with the RPF government in place, the US ‘‘will be putting two hundred people
on the ground in Kigali’’ as part of a humanitarian mission. ‘‘Everyone has to play
their proper role,’’ Attwood concludes, ‘‘I think that’s the role we define ourselves.’’
A Public Relations Exercise?
In addition to its focus on UN bureaucratic failure, Newsnight’s extended debate also
appears to whitewash events in order to further dumb down public questioning of
British foreign policy. This is most noticeable in the discourse of Conservative MP
Nicolas Budgeon, who contends that the British government will only act to prevent
political violence or war abroad at the behest of the British public. When asked
by Wark whether the Organization of the African Unity (OAU) needs more help,
Budgeon appropriates an argument that had previously been used to challenge
nation states on their failure to act to prevent genocide and then subverts it by re-
minding the audience that domestic priorities must come first. In doing so, Budgeon
taps into both the fears and needs of the average British citizen, or perhaps the
average viewer of Newsnight in 1994:
The so-called international community doesn’t have a budget and doesn’t have any
money . . . it is all about political will. What this boils down to is whether there is a
national political will. And in this instance, I don’t find people coming up to me in
the streets and saying ‘‘I’d like my son to go and fight in Rwanda and run the risk of
being killed.’’ Nor if you ask them ‘‘are you in favour of a lot of money being spent
there’’ are they prepared, for instance, to delay the start of a new hospital so as to
aid in Rwanda.75
As part of the program, BBC World Affairs editor John Simpson provides a personal
commentary. Filmed in an editing suite, Simpson considers why it was that the
international community neglected Rwanda. Simpson appropriates the ‘‘balance of
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power’’ image of politics to contend that during the Cold War ‘‘no one hung around
waiting for a public reaction’’ and states that nations have ‘‘cut back on long-term
development aid’’76 to focus on short-term relief. Simpson concludes his ‘‘expert’’
analysis by arguing that ‘‘public opinion’s only aroused once the crisis point has
already arisen.’’ The inclusion of Simpson, as the BBC’s World Affairs editor, masks
Newsnight’s own failure to extend its ‘‘ in-depth political analysis’’ to challenge UK
politicians during the three months of genocide. And it is quite ironic that Newsnight
now discusses the need to rouse public interest in order to ensure that governments
act, when the program itself failed to report on the British public’s interest in
Rwanda in early May.
Conclusion: Newsnight’s Denial
Fein has argued that denial can take many forms and includes a failure to recognize
an event as genocide at the time.77 Policy elites of allied states have a political inter-
est in denying genocide in order to demonstrate loyalty or allegiance to the country
or allied countries that are closely connected to the state committing genocide. It
has been suggested that Britain’s engagement in politics of revisionism at the time
stemmed from a loyalty to France: an early Freedom of Information (FOI) request
to the UK Foreign Office in 2005 for information on Britain’s knowledge of genocide
at the time was rejected on the grounds that it would compromise Britain’s relation-
ship with France.78 Fein indicates that governments and elites often adopt various
framing devices to confuse public opinion. My analysis of Newsnight suggests that
between April and the end of July 1994 the program did well to convey a sense of
confusion, off-setting media evidence of genocide in the news features with sensa-
tionalized statements by news presenters to the contrary and confining debates to
brokering a UN cease-fire and the bureaucratic failings of the UN. Newsnight’s con-
trol over studio discussions and its reluctance to add to its media agenda the obvious
debate—is this war or genocide?—between April and July 1994, followed by the
sudden appearance of members of the then Conservative government once the RPF
had taken control of the country are both particularly striking.
In failing, and quite possibly deliberately avoiding, to use the legal term geno-
cide, the Newsnight team was not obliged to follow the BBC’s own mandate of
aggressively interrogating British politicians. Rather, the presenters are seen to be
aggressively interrogating a host of international politicians who themselves make
no reference to Britain’s status as a permanent member of the UN Security Council.
The tactic of avoiding British influence in international politics is strengthened by
an alignment to the frameworks propounded by Samuel Huntingdon in his Clash of
Civilisations and Robert Kaplan’s The Coming of Anarchy, which assume there is a
morally constituted ‘‘international community’’ to police world politics from which
Britain appears to be decidedly absent.79
The continued ignorance of Britain’s citizens of the decision making of British
government representatives such as Lord Hannay and Linda Chalker during the
Rwandan Genocide is endemic of British foreign policy. Melvern asserts that the
UK’s foreign affairs are the ‘‘most private realm of political affairs in the UK’’ and
that ‘‘there is a governance which is unaccountable and does not have parliamentary
oversight.’’80 Melvern and Williams have contended that there is a need to under-
take a thorough assessment of the government under John Major’s leadership in
either preventing or suppressing genocide in Rwanda in 1994 or helping to facilitate
and prolong it.81 Newsnight’s failure to challenge UK politicians has further hindered
a collective understanding of the extent to which the British government practiced
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denial and has prevented the sourcing of additional leads of inquiry which might
expose individuals who should be held to account for failing to act on behalf of
British citizens. As observed, many academic studies concentrate on the role of the
UK media in influencing British foreign policy. Yet my own analysis of Newsnight
suggests that one of the most crucial questions remains unanswered: to what extent
were politicians influencing the Newsnight agenda? David Belton, who when inter-
viewed appeared to be surprised that Newsnight presenters did not use the word
genocide throughout the course of reporting between April and July, provides some
idea of the logic behind the selection of studio guests:
I’m not sure if Newsnight tried to contact [then Minister of Foreign Affairs] Douglas
Hurd and he turned them down. In my experience, the only person that matters is a
government minister—preferably from the Foreign Office. It is not so important if it
is a member of a party making a claim. . . . If he could avoid answering questions on
Bosnia, think how much easier it is to avoid answering questions on Rwanda—for
example ‘‘deeply regretful, monitoring the situation, doing all we can. . . .’’82
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George Steiner and the War against the
Jews: A Study in Misrepresentation
Roger W. Smith
College of William and Mary
The literary and cultural critic George Steiner has been described as the pre-
eminent literary critic of the past fifty years. Certainly, he has written eloquently
about aspects of the Holocaust, and his emphasis on language and its power to
make and unmake much of human life, has been widely influential. Yet Steiner’s
work on the Holocaust is misleading in its interpretations, explanations, and
implications. Part of this stems from his worry that the Jews brought their near
destruction upon themselves: that they had invented the practice of genocide, had
invented the idea of a ‘‘chosen people,’’ had through Moses, Jesus, and Marx
created such moral demands upon ordinary human beings that the tension
became unbearable and resulted in a revolt against the tyranny of conscience and
perfection. Part of it comes from his uncritical focus on Freudian psychology and
reliance on literary works as a substitute for history. Yet there is almost always
the dazzling prose, which can overwhelm critical thought and lead one away
from a factual understanding of the origins and consequences of the Holocaust.
The present article provides a critical assessment of Steiner’s interpretation of the
Holocaust, its antecedents, causes, and consequences.
Key words: Holocaust, forms of explanation, George Steiner, Moses, Freud,
survivors
Genocide is a species of total war, but one in which the attempt is not to defeat the
‘‘enemy’’ using any means possible, but rather to eliminate the ‘‘enemy’’ in whole or
in part, whether armed or unarmed. This was the pattern in the ancient world and
it is now common in the modern age, with Rwanda being the most recent case. The
example best known today is what some historians call ‘‘The War against the Jews,’’
while most others know it as the Holocaust.1
The literary and cultural critic George Steiner has written eloquently about
aspects of the Holocaust in numerous essays and books. Many of us who came of
age in the 1970s in the United States and write about genocide were influenced by
his focus on the power of the ‘‘Word’’: language and its power to make and unmake
much of human life. Here is the concern he has about language but also about the
power of the humanities to curb violence against humans:
Central to everything I am and believe and have written is my astonishment, naı¨ve as
it seems to people, that you can use human speech both to bless, to love, to build, to
forgive and also to torture, to hate, to destroy, and to annihilate.2
Nathan Scott of the University of Virginia described George Steiner as the pre-
eminent literary critic of the last half of the twentieth century, and the late Terrence
Des Pres, a Holocaust scholar of the first order, said there was ‘‘no doubt of his
brilliance.’’3
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Yet Steiner’s work on the Holocaust is misleading in its interpretations, explana-
tions, and implications. Part of this stems from Steiner’s own worry that the Jews
brought their near destruction upon themselves: that they had invented the practice
of genocide, had invented the idea of a ‘‘chosen people,’’ had through Moses, Jesus,
and Marx created such moral demands upon ordinary human beings that the tension
became unbearable and resulted in a revolt against the tyranny of conscience and
perfection. Part of it stems from his uncritical focus on Freudian psychology, reliance
on literary works as a substitute for history, and apparent distance from empirical
social science. One appreciates Steiner’s deep moral concern, his Enlightenment
belief in the power of the humanities to shield us from barbarism, and his vivid
and often dazzling prose. In these and other ways, Steiner is, in Plato’s phrase, ‘‘the
Honeyed Muse,’’ the artist whose work is seductively beautiful, but leads us radically
astray.
Steiner imagines in all sincerity that it was the ennui of bourgeois culture at the
close of the nineteenth century that helped pave the way for visions of destruction,
culminating in the attempt to destroy the Jews; that the density of population in
the industrial-urban milieu triggered instincts of devastation or, as he puts it,
‘‘some obscure but primal need for free space, for the silence in which the ego can
cry out its mastery’’4; that the concentration camps that played a decisive role in
the killing of Jews (and others) were a literal version of ‘‘Hell,’’ forgetting that in
Christian belief Hell was a place of justice. And he subscribes to Elias Canetti’s
view that the Holocaust was made possible by the abstraction of large numbers
related to the collapse of currency in the 1920s. Large numbers had only ‘‘unreal
meaning’’ which ‘‘tainted with unreality the disappearance and liquidation of
peoples.’’5 On the other hand, Steiner is particularly concerned with why literature
and other aspects of the humanities did not prevent the Holocaust and indeed origi-
nated in a land of high civilization. As often is the case with Steiner, there are
important points scored but opportunities missed. Here he gives no consideration to
civic and political culture, which may well serve as barriers to genocide or spurs to
it. And one final example: he alters the concept of ‘‘survivor’’ beyond recognition.
The Survivor Theme
One can relate to Steiner’s deep concern with the failure of the humanities to serve
as a barrier to the Holocaust yet point out his lack of understanding of the impor-
tance of civic and political awareness, the role of authoritarian culture (he can deal
with this only in terms of the German language), and how, in a time of crisis, the
humanities and their claims to furthering a disposition toward decency and morality
can be overcome by nationalism and the psychology of ‘‘us and them.’’
On the other hand, what is one to make of Steiner’s claim that he is ‘‘a kind of
survivor?’’6 Not a ‘‘literal survivor,’’ but ‘‘a kind of survivor.’’ His family left France
in 1940, shortly before the Nazis arrived, and lived a comfortable life in New York
City as the Holocaust proceeded. Some critics have described Steiner’s claim as
arrogant, self-indulgent, and masochistic (the latter comes from non-psychologists
who have read a little Freud). Those statements may well be right, but my own
reflections are quite different.
Steiner was born in Paris on 23 April 1929; he attended a Lycee there until the
family moved to New York in January 1940. With the exception of Steiner and one
other student, all of the Jewish students in his school were killed by the Nazis with
the collaboration of the French police. Today, all over Paris, there are schools that
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have inscriptions that mention the destruction of their Jewish students and speak of
the collaboration of the French authorities in carrying it out.
George Steiner writes,
We left France, where I was born and brought up in safety. So I happened not to be
there when the names were called out. I did not stand in public squares with the
other children with whom I had grown up. Or see my father or mother disappear
with the train doors torn open. But in another sense I am a survivor, and not intact.7
He sees himself as a survivor, not only because of his fellow students who did not
survive, but because the ‘‘black mystery of what happened in Europe is to me indi-
visible from my own identity.’’8 He cannot be normal; his relationships with others
are simply different because of the Holocaust, or at least that is what he says. And
he appears to have a deep desire to enter into the pain of those who died, who were
killed in a horrible manner. Nowhere does he express it more openly than in his
commentary on a poem by Sylvia Plath.
Shortly before the American poet Sylvia Plath committed suicide by putting her
head into a gas oven, she wrote a number of Holocaust poems. Steiner thought some
of them went to the heart of what the Holocaust experience must have been and
noted that they came from an American, non-Jewish woman. But I think he also
had himself in mind when he wrote the following: ‘‘Perhaps it is only those who
had no part in the events who can focus on them rationally and imaginatively;
to those who experienced the thing, it has lost the hard edges of possibility; it has
stepped outside the real.’’9
So according to Steiner, those who were not there, in the places of deportation
and killing, are those who can report accurately on what happened in the ghettos
and in the camps and are the ones who, unlike the victims, can make sense of the
terrible events. Steiner characteristically does not make many comparative state-
ments. Was this true only of the Holocaust, or would he extend the same vision to
the Armenians, Cambodians, Tutsi? This kind of approach is one of the reasons that
critics have argued that Steiner is using the Holocaust to aggrandize himself, claim-
ing to be a kind of survivor. But if it is a matter of being ‘‘affected’’ (a loose and
indefinite word) by genocide—any genocide—who, except those who are indifferent,
is not a survivor; who is not a victim? Genocide is a crime committed on the body of
a particular people, but also against humankind. It reduces for all time biological
and cultural possibilities, it reduces the plurality of human existence, and, when
any group claims the right to determine who has the right to live, all humans are
under attack. Still, is not the basic notion of a ‘‘survivor’’ that of one who has been
directly victimized and has somehow survived and gone on, more or less, with a life?
Steiner, with whose personal account I am sympathetic, alters the whole concept of
what a ‘‘survivor’’ is, distorting it beyond recognition, diluting and diverting it, as we
shall see, into a matter of identification and the preservation of a Jewish humanistic
tradition.
What about those ethnic/racial/religious groups whose recent ancestors (and the
question can be raised, how far back do we go?) have been subjected to genocide?
Some will have strong cultural or intellectual traditions, while others may not. If
we adopt Steiner’s standard, they would seem to be of lesser importance, less likely
to be ‘‘survivors’’ than he is. But then his standard is very individualistic, very much
a matter of egocentrism, and he certainly privileges the Holocaust over all other
genocides, and in that he is not alone. Yet how many Jews, from whatever country
or circumstances during or after the Holocaust, qualify in his terms as a ‘‘kind of
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survivor?’’ Is this a solo act? Has he ever sought out those who were free from
the direct terror of the Nazi onslaught, living in a safe environment during the
Holocaust, but who have his sense of being ‘‘a kind of survivor?’’ It could be an
extraordinary exercise, painful, dissonant, even confirmatory.
The problem that I have with Steiner’s use of the idea of the ‘‘survivor’’ is that
it distorts the concept of ‘‘survivor,’’ it shows disrespect for actual survivors of the
Holocaust, and it privileges a literary and humanistic life, equating writing a few
books with the millions who died in the Holocaust. The other problem I have with
his approach is that he never discusses the other genocides (Armenian, Cambodian,
Rwandan, and others) in the same terms. Of course, he is providing a kind of memoir
of his own obsession with the Holocaust (‘‘the Holocaust left its mark on me’’), but a
few comparative statements would have been helpful. Do those who were potential
victims of other recent genocides, but were safe because abroad, see themselves
as survivors? Or is Steiner reflecting on his own experience and aspiration rather
than pointing to a common reaction of those saved from victimization by geographi-
cal separation?
The themes that Steiner addresses in Plath’s poems can be described as masoch-
istic, but I would see his concern with them as a matter of empathy. On the other
hand, he gives credence to other interpretations. In speaking of Plath’s poem
‘‘Daddy,’’ in which she ‘‘became a woman being transported to Auschwitz,’’10 he
deeply identifies with her evocation of events that she had not actually witnessed,
but with which she had a fateful identification and longing. Speaking for her, but
also for himself, Steiner writes, ‘‘Was there latent in Sylvia Plath’s sensibility, as in
that of many of us who remember only by fiat of imagination, a fearful envy, a dim
resentment at not having been there, of having missed a rendezvous with hell?’’11
Steiner is a survivor of sorts, but only at a distance; he can only imagine what
his schoolmates and Jews of many backgrounds suffered. He wishes that he had
been there and claims that he was envious for having ‘‘missed a rendezvous with
hell.’’ Yet he sees himself as a ‘‘kind of survivor.’’ His relations with others, his life’s
work, and his daily thought revolve around the Holocaust. Still what is striking
about Steiner’s claim to be a kind of survivor is his cultural claim that he is one of
the last survivors of the lost and destroyed Jewish humanistic culture of the nine-
teenth and early twentieth centuries: Heine, Bergson, Hofmannstahl, Proust, Marx,
Kafka, Freud; Wittgenstein should certainly be added to the list. But Steiner is
attuned to the Word and leaves out the strong presence of the many composers of
Jewish origin, such as Mahler and Stravinsky, and of major artists, such as Chagall,
perhaps because he can only see himself as a successor to literary artists and critics,
not philosophers, painters, and musicians.12 But that leaves out an amazing part of
the Jewish humanistic contributions to contemporary life and defies his notion that
most of the Jewish contributions are now behind us, partly because of the Holocaust,
but for other reasons as well.
That which has been destroyed–the large mass of life so mocked, so hounded to
oblivion that even the names are gone and the prayer for the dead can have no exact
foothold–embodied a particular genius, a quality of intelligence and feeling which
none of the major Jewish communities now surviving preserved or recaptured.
Because I feel that specific inheritance in my own reflexes in the work I try to do, I
am a kind of survivor.13
Steiner goes on to talk about the humanities in Central Europe and how Jewish
contributions were at the forefront, not only among intellectuals but in communities
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as well, whether in Prague, Vienna, Berlin, or Paris. But he comments, after the
Holocaust, ‘‘Almost nothing of it survives.’’14 Still, he sees himself as a successor to
the great figures who had gone before, a successor to the Jewish humanistic culture
that has now largely disappeared. He wants to think of himself in this respect as one
who keeps a tradition alive and, in his view, thus as a survivor.15
Steiner is good with words, but here he fails: rather than ‘‘survivor,’’ the appro-
priate term is ‘‘heir.’’ He may well be the heir to a tradition, a heritage, which he
sees as his duty to continue, but this is a far cry from the idea of a survivor. Yes,
cultures survive or they don’t, but it is a fallacy to confuse the survival of a culture
with the survival of humans in the face of politically imposed death. Steiner surely
must be aware that being a survivor in a literary sense—which as I have suggested
is a misuse of words—cannot be equated with the same notion of survival where
victims of the Holocaust, or of any genocide, are concerned.
The Central Argument
I have already referred to some of Steiner’s explanations of the Holocaust: density of
population, noise that sets one’s nerves on edge, large numbers losing their meaning
due to inflation, and thus an intellectual inability to respond to the mass killings of
so many millions of people in Europe. These are contained in Steiner’s most powerful
statement of his understanding of why the Holocaust took place and why the Jews
were its victims, his eloquent and seductive essay ‘‘A Season in Hell’’ in In Blue-
beard’s Castle, published in 1971. These claims can be easily dismissed. If it were a
question of density, lack of personal space, and noise, then genocides should have
broken out—in fact should be taking place at this very moment—in Tokyo, Mexico
City, Sao Paulo, New York, Marseille. And with regard to the large-numbers thesis,
there are two issues: first, how many people actually knew the extent of the killing of
Jews? In Germany, not so many; in Ukraine, where executions were in the open,
more people were aware of it. And, second, why does Steiner not mention the other
groups, such as Gypsies and Soviet prisoners of war, who were killed by the Nazis in
incredible numbers? I shall come to this in a moment, but other mass killings do not
fit into Steiner’s theological explanation of the Holocaust. His narrative and explana-
tion only refer to Jews. Even within the killing done by the Nazis and their allies,
there were others killed and, of course, those killed in genocides before and after
the Nazi period.
There is an additional issue here: even if Germans knew about many of the
deaths (which is questionable) but large numbers had blunted their capacity to
respond, might they not have understood that war—especially modern, total war—
claims many victims, civilian and military, but could still have wondered why all
the other killings took place? Put differently, if big numbers explain some things,
they do not explain much. But if one wants to pursue the theme, the inability to
respond to the massive loss of life during World War II, from whatever causes, was
most likely due to the mass carnage of World War I, where in the Battle of
the Somme alone over a million and a half casualties occurred and an additional
700,000 at Verdun.
Steiner has misrepresented the Holocaust and the antecedents of genocide, here
and in other cases. But the heart of his argument is that the cause of the Holocaust
was Moses, Jesus, and Marx—Jewish perfectionism and ethical pressure on an
unwilling human nature. He reaches the conclusion that the Jews brought the
Holocaust upon themselves.16 He even writes a novel in which Hitler is alive, though
old, in the Amazon rain forest, and Hitler says that everything he did he learned
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from the Jews.17 Although this is a novel, there is a close similarity between Hitler’s
arguments in a trial held in the jungle and Steiner’s own arguments and, indeed,
closeness of language. Shakespeare is not Hamlet, and Steiner is not the A.H. of his
fiction, but Steiner identifies a type of closeness, not necessarily between himself and
Hitler (God forbid), but between ancient Judaism and Hitler’s ideology. He mentions
that the 90-year old Hitler has a ‘‘withered right arm.’’ And so does George Steiner
due to a birth defect. How do we interpret this? Is it just a coincidence or something
more? Is it perhaps a recognition, in terms of the Hitler speech, that Judaism and
Nazism have some things in common: the idea of a ‘‘chosen people’’ and the idea
that ancient Hebrews committed genocide repeatedly, and perhaps even invented
the practice? This is the great burden that hangs over Steiner, and it is an extra-
ordinary question: Did the Jews create the very model of their destruction? Is Hitler
correct in identifying the Jews as his inspiration for the destruction of that group?
Steiner is right to recognize that the ancient Jews did engage in what today
would be called genocide. If we can trust the accounts in the early books of the Bible,
such as that in Numbers 31, again and again, whole groups were destroyed.18 But
what Steiner and his fictional Hitler (or A.H. as he is called in The Portage to San
Cristobal of A.H.) fail to tell us is that the attempt to eliminate whole groups was
the common mode of warfare in early society. The Assyrians in the eighth century
BCE, for example, embarked on genocidal destruction almost annually, afterward
erecting monuments boasting of their ’’success.’’ Beyond that, the Greeks and
Romans also engaged in the destruction of whole groups (Melos and Carthage, for
example). And Hitler would have been aware of the destruction wreaked by Genghis
Khan, but above all, the Young Turk genocide of over one million Armenians that
began in 1915.
Two facts stand out: no one knows who invented genocide, and those who have
sought to commit it have had no lack of models from which to choose. Nevertheless,
Steiner is caught in a web of anxiety over the possibility that not only had the Jews
brought on their own destruction, but that they provided the basic idea of how to
carry out the elimination of a people.
With regard to the exclusiveness and exalted status of a particular group, a
‘‘chosen people,’’ Steiner hardly puts up a fight. The ‘‘poison,’’ he says, ‘‘ is in ancient
part, Jewish.’’19 But is there no difference between a people chosen by God to bring
his presence into the world and who have deep responsibilities imposed upon them
by God and, on the other hand, a ‘‘master race’’ that is biological, naturalistic, with
no assigned moral imperatives? Steiner could have pursued these issues, but he does
not; this again suggests his acceptance of the Jews’ responsibility for the Holocaust.
He describes the matter as follows:
By one of the cruel, deep ironies of history, the concept of a chosen people, of a nation
exalted above others by a particular destiny, was born in Israel. In the vocabulary of
Nazism there were elements of a vengeful parody on the Judaic claim. The theological
motif of a people elected at Sinai is echoed in the pretense of the master race and its
chiliastic dominion. Thus there was in the obsessed relation of Nazi to Jew a minute
but fearful grain of logic.20
But Steiner should surely tell us of what the ‘‘elements of parody’’ consist, and since
there is only a ‘‘minute’’ element of logic connecting the ancient Jewish claim with
that of the Nazis’ master race, what is that minute element and how are the two
concepts otherwise distinguished? Still, these issues provide more evidence of the
cloud that hangs over him and lead to serious misrepresentations of the Holocaust
and, above all, the question of why.
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Steiner’s central argument is a variant on Freud’s in Civilization and Its Dis-
contents.21 Freud claimed that society was increasingly imposing moral demands
on individuals that were contrary to their nature and which they could not possibly
fulfill. The attempt was to curb sexuality (he was writing in 1929) and human
instincts toward aggression. But the demands, which he termed the ‘‘cultural super-
ego,’’ collided with the instinctual needs (the id) of individuals. The result was
enormous tension between the ethical exhortations/demands and the biologically
based needs of the individual. Freud saw an increasing sense of guilt, unhappiness,
and neurosis in society and argued for a lowering of the moral burdens on individuals.
Freud’s individuals were rebels, but impotent rebels; they were unhappy, a few of
them committed crimes to relieve the pressure, but many others either accepted their
unhappiness or became anxious, depressed, or neurotic; and many women, unlike
men, became hysterical.
Steiner’s individuals (but why only in Germany and a few other places?) are also
rebels who can no longer bear the demands made upon them, but instead of retreat-
ing into neurosis, they become killers. But such an explanation will not do. Not
everyone in Germany or anywhere else engaged in genocide. So, how does one dis-
tinguish between those who felt the pressure of righteous, yet utopian, demands
and did not kill and those who felt the same demands and did kill?
To go back to the beginning, Steiner argues that the Jews/Moses invented mono-
theism. In effect, they invented God, but an invisible God, one who was all demand-
ing and was the only God, displacing the polytheism that was for people at the time
the fundamental means by which to explain the world in which they lived. Then
Jesus followed, with his radical demands for ascetic love, compassion, self-suppression,
and the disdain of worldly goods. Finally, there was Marx and the claims of a socialist
society, in which privilege and property would be abolished and all forms of oppression
would be eliminated.22
Three times a demand was made for perfection and self-sacrifice; three times,
that is, a utopian demand was made that collided with ordinary human capacities
to respond. Three times, a Jew was at the center: Moses, Jesus, Marx. But Steiner
tells us,
Nothing is more cruel than the blackmail of perfection. We come to hate, to fear most
those who demand of us a self-transcendence, a surpassing of our natural and com-
mon limits of being. Our hate and fear are the more intense precisely because we
know the absolute rightness, the ultimate desirability of the demand. In failing to
respond adequately, we fail ourselves. And it is of deep-lying self-hatreds that hatreds
spring.23
Here, one may object to Steiner’s assumption about the ‘‘absolute rightness’’ that
‘‘we’’ accept. Who is the ‘‘we?’’ And is it not the case that many persons are atheists
and so the question of one God as opposed to many is not an issue? Also, there are
few individuals who have ever been able to respond to the radical demands of Jesus,
though lip service has undoubtedly been paid to them. And while Marx has had
many adherents, and still does in an intellectual sense, how many people can believe
in the possibility of a utopian society as Marx had presented it?
But if ‘‘we’’ do not accept monotheism or God, if ‘‘we’’ do not respond to the
radical demands of Jesus, and if ‘‘we’’ either reject the demands of Marx or do not
see the possibility of actually bringing about the kind of society he had in mind,
then where will the anger come from or the hate that will be directed toward Jews?
And why only Jews? Why not Christians and many others as the object of hatred?
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Well, as it turns out, the Nazis had a very long list of those to be killed and it was
not limited to what Steiner imagines as the Jews appearing three times, demanding
perfection and self-sacrifice.
The details are different, but the theory is Freud’s: cultural demands and a sense
of guilt collide with the instinctual portion of human nature, the id. Something has
to give: for Freud the moral demands lead to neurosis; for Steiner they lead to the
Holocaust.
It is a convenient and simple theory, but it ignores almost all of the facts leading
up to the Holocaust: social, political, ideological (social Darwinism and racial science,
preceded by a long history of anti-Semitism). And it does not account for the fact that
the Holocaust did not take place earlier. Just when did the revolt against the three
Jewish utopians build up, and why at that moment? Why not elsewhere as well?
Also, why was the Holocaust mainly directed against Jews? Since Steiner indicates
that Jesus was a central figure here, why not against Christians as well? And how
can any of what Steiner proposes about the origin of the Holocaust, explain, or help
to explain, any other genocide?
In the end, Steiner takes the Nazi onslaught against the Jews as retribution for
Moses, Jesus, and Marx.
Concluding Remarks
George Steiner, now in his eighties, is the author of some twenty books and hundreds
of articles and reviews, with many awards for his cultural and literary contributions.
He was educated at the University of Paris, the University of Chicago, Harvard, and
Oxford, and was a fellow at the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton. He has
been in residence or lectured at most of the major universities in the Western world,
including Oxford, Cambridge, Harvard, and Stanford, among many others. He was
for many years Professor of Comparative Literature at the University of Geneva,
where he gave lectures in four languages.
Steiner is a brilliant writer who has spent years interpreting the destruction of
the Jews. His narrative has never changed, yet the ideas can startle: the Jews were
killed, not because they ‘‘Killed God,’’ but because they ‘‘invented God.’’24 An inter-
esting idea to be sure, but totally unanchored in historical fact.
Various scholars have said that Steiner’s views on the Holocaust were the result
of a split in his personality, that he was self-hating, that he was simply arrogant. I
cannot speak to any of these comments, but my own are very different.
I have argued, and I think shown, that George Steiner, even though obsessed
with the Holocaust, has seriously misrepresented it in various ways. He is not a
person who relates to social science studies; he has a superficial acquaintance with
Freud but bases much of his argument on one of Freud’s popular works; and he
is not someone who thinks historically, despite his claim to do so. He is decidedly
ahistorical and that is where many of the problems with his work begin and end.
The basic problem with Steiner’s work is that, despite his apparent use of
history, his whole approach is literary. For him symbols are everything, and they
involve both representation and causation. He identifies a text, Dante’s Inferno, and
then sees it as the model for concentration camps; he sees some similarity between
this and that, and explains it in terms of cultural determinism. But cannot there be
similarity without direct causation? Or does cultural determinism put symbols to
work with almost foreordained results? Steiner starts with a symbol and then points
to a result, but fails to fill in the historical, empirical connection between the two; or
he starts with a result, and then hunts for a symbol that can be said to have served
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as a model or inspiration for the event, but again, he does not make the actual con-
nection. Is social and historical reality only a matter of symbols and metaphors and
is that the theory of knowledge that Steiner has adopted? In effect, Steiner’s
approach is long on assumption and short on demonstration. This is perhaps not
surprising since he is known to have said that the Holocaust cannot be explained by
empirical and historical analyses since these are unable to reach down to ‘‘the roots
of the inhuman.’’25
But does his reliance on Freud and the revolt against instinctual repression get
down to the roots of the inhuman? Far from it, and it is worth noting that Freud
thought that socialism could relieve pressures on individuals in their quest to live a
full life. Also, while he dismissed all religion as an illusion, Freud never considered
heightened moral pressures as a problem that derived from monotheism. Nor did he
put Moses at the center; Moses is not even mentioned in Civilization and Its Dis-
contents. Moreover, Freud even suggested in Moses and Monotheism (1939) that
Moses was not a Jew at all, but rather an Egyptian who was murdered by the Jews
as they approached the Promised Land. It is Steiner’s idea of an instinctual revolt
against the Jewish demand for perfection by Moses, Jesus, and Marx, which after a
genesis of 3000 years came to a fever pitch in the twentieth century, that remains to
be documented if, indeed, it can be.
Steiner never demonstrates that there was such instinctual repression or, if
there were, that it was identified as emanating from Jews. And even if it were, why
did the Holocaust occur when it did (not earlier or later) and where it did? Were
people in other lands having a jolly time, while only the Germans were instinctually
repressed to the breaking point?
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The article by Marko Attila Hoare, ‘‘A Case Study in Underachievement: The Inter-
national Courts and Genocide in Bosnia-Herzegovina,’’ GSP 6, 1 (April 2011): 81–97,
was published with the following errors:
On p. 81, for ‘‘Only one middle-ranking individual has been convicted of a genocide-
related charge by the ICTY’’ read ‘‘Only one middle-ranking individual has been
definitely convicted of a genocide-related charge by the ICTY’’; for ‘‘So far, the ICTY
has successfully prosecuted one individual for genocide’’ read ‘‘’So far, the ICTY has
definitely successfully prosecuted one individual for genocide’’.
On p. 83, for ‘‘Only one individual—a lowly deputy corps commander—has been
convicted of a genocide-related charge by an international court’’ read ‘‘Only one
individual—a lowly deputy corps commander—has definitely been convicted of a
genocide-related charge by a fully international court’’.
On p. 93, for ‘‘Among Croats, the acquittal of one member of the Vukovar Three and
the initial sentencing of a second member to only a short prison term are likewise
widely viewed as evidence of anti-Croat bias, and have even provoked a complaint
from the Croatian parliament itself ’’ read ‘‘Among Croats, the acquittal of one
member of the Vukovar Three and the initial sentencing of a second member to
only a short prison term were likewise widely viewed as evidence of anti-Croat bias,
and even provoked a complaint from the Croatian parliament itself ’’.
An updated version of the article containing these corrections is now available
at GSP Online (doi:10.3138/gsp.6.1.81). GSP and our publisher regret these errors,
which are the sole responsibility of the publisher.
